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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
State economic regulations may compete with federal antitrust
laws. A state law that attempts to avoid economic collapse by per-
mitting or ordering competing producers to agree on prices and
outputs for their products, for example, appears to conflict with
the Sherman Act, which prohibits such agreements.'
Pursuant to the supremacy clause of the Constitution,2 federal
laws preempt conflicting state laws. But the existence or extent of
such conflict is often uncertain. Although state law may ostensibly
conflict with the Sherman Act, the purpose of the state law may in
fact be consistent with federal antitrust policy. And although the
Sherman Act does not expressly specify an exemption for all state
regulations, other federal economic regulations may, expressly or
by implication, exempt state-regulated activity from application of
antitrust legislation.3
The "state action" exemption doctrine is the United States Su-
preme Court's resolution to the problem raised by apparent con-
flicts between federal antitrust laws and state regulation. The
Court has interpreted the Sherman Act to contain an implied
"state action" exemption for all economic activity either under-
taken by a state or authorized by a clearly articulated state policy
that involves active state supervision.'
The state action exemption is not a coherent resolution of the
tension between federal preemption and state autonomy. The reso-
lution has drawn criticism for affording too little deference to state
1. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (Price and output agreements among com-
petitors, generally per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act, were required by Cali-
fornia regulations). The Sherman Act makes unlawful "every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sev-
eral States." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
2. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The supremacy clause declares the constitution, laws, and
treaties of the United States to be the supreme law of the land.
3. See infra text accompanying note 253-56. See also McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011-1012 (1987).
4. See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97
(1980). See also Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46-47 (1985) (municipal
action must be authorized by clearly articulated state policy, but need not be actively super-
vised by the municipality).
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autonomy,5 and for deferring too much to state autonomy.' The
Court at times has been its own critic, noting that the doctrine
resulted in cases that "have not been entirely clear."' 7 The exemp-
tion apparently rests on a negative inference, drawn from "vague
'principles of federalism' ,, and the absence in the Sherman Act of
express reference to state regulation,9 that Congress did not intend
to allow the Act to preempt state regulations that are clearly ar-
ticulated and involve active supervision.10
Without the strained negative inference, the Sherman Act would
preempt conflicting state regulation. Consequently, the interpreta-
tion competes with the supremacy clause and undermines Sherman
Act policies. State policies that conflict with the Act's policies may
nevertheless escape preemption due to the Sherman Act's "federal-
ism" policy of implied exemption for state action."
This Article proposes that the vague principles of federalism, ju-
dicially perceived to be implicit in the Sherman Act, can more co-
herently and consistently be implemented without the strained in-
ference. The "federalism" interpretation of the Sherman Act as the
conflict resolution method should be abandoned and replaced with
the interest analysis Brainerd Currie developed for resolution of
litigation involving the apparently conflicting laws of different
states.'2 An interest analysis, applied to possible conflicts between
the Sherman Act and state law, would effectively accommodate
both federal and state interests.
5. See, e.g., Lopatka, The State of "State Action" Antitrust Immunity: A Progress Re-
port, 46 LA. L. R.v. 941 (1986); Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation:
Parker v. Brown in the Economic Theory of Legislation, 1987 DUKE L.J. 618.
6. See, e.g., Cirace, An Economic Analysis of the "State-Municipal Action" Antitrust
Cases, 61 TEx. L. REv. 481 (1982); Conant, The Supremacy Clause and State Economic
Controls: The Antitrust Maze, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 255 (1983); Werden & Balmer,
Conflicts Between State Law and the Sherman Act, 44 U. Pirr. L. RE V. 1 (1982); Wiley, A
Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARv. L. R.v. 713 (1986).
7. Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46.
8. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 74 (1985) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
9. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351-52 (1943).
10. The inference is not constitutionally compelled. The tenth amendment reserves to the
states only those powers not constitutionally delegated to the federal government nor pro-
hibited to the states, and federal antitrust legislation is clearly derived from the expressly
delegated constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 230-320.
12. B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
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Currie's approach stresses conflict avoidance: a "true conflict"' 3
exists only when conflicting policies underlie the apparently con-
flicting rules of different jurisdictions and each jurisdiction has an
interest in the application of its policy to the particular case
presented."4 If only one jurisdiction has such an interest, the law of
that jurisdiction is applied, resolving what is actually a "false con-
flict."1 5 In the event of a true conflict, however, a judicial choice
between the conflicting policies must be made. Generally, unless an
authoritative choice of law rule dictates a different choice, the
choice is to pick the policy of the forum.'
Application of Currie's interest analysis to potentially conflicting
federal and state laws would result in federal preemption, to the
extent necessary to implement the federal interest, when a true
conflict exists. In such cases, the supremacy clause, the authorita-
tive choice of law rule for true conflicts between federal and state
laws, requires that the federal rule will apply. Consequently, Cur-
rie's approach, in contrast with the implied state action exemption,
would accommodate Sherman Act and supremacy clause values by
refusing to authorize the subordination of federal antitrust policies
to conflicting state policies.
Despite the nondeferential treatment of state policy in cases of
true conflict, however, Currie's approach also would accommodate
federalism values and state interests. If a false conflict exists due
to the lack of a state interest, the Sherman Act can be applied
without preempting any state law. False conflicts resulting from
the lack of a federal interest allow for application of state law. In
addition, Currie's method requires a moderate and restrained reas-
sessment of state and federal policies and interests before conclud-
ing that the supremacy clause necessitates preemption of state pol-
icy.'17 A moderate and restrained view of the substantive (rather
than federalism) Sherman Act policies serves to significantly re-
duce the number of true conflicts, leaving many state policies in-
tact. A conclusion upon reassessment that either the state or fed-
13. Id. at 183-84.
14. See id.
15. Id. at 183-84.
16. Id.
17. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754, 757 (1963).
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eral government lacks an actual interest signals a false conflict, and
the state policy will not be preempted.
This Article contains four parts. Part I briefly identifies state ac-
tion conflicts, the existing rules for applying state action immunity,
and some criticisms of the current approach.18 Part II critically re-
views the conflict resolution method that the Supreme Court
adopted in Parker v. Brown19 and the more recent extensions of
that case; it then proposes Currie's interest analysis as an alterna-
tive.20 Part III undertakes an interest analysis of various state ac-
tion conflicts in Supreme Court cases. 21 Part IV contrasts the in-
terest analysis resolution with the current regime.2 2 It suggests that
in certain respects the current state action exemption process,
which involves a threshold inquiry and requires clear articulation
and active supervision, already implements a form of interest anal-
ysis. Consequently, a change to a more explicit interest analysis
would not require a radical shift from the current approach. A
more direct application of interest analysis, however, would avoid
significant intrusions into both federal and state interests.
I. THE STATE ACTION PROBLEM
A. Different Forms of State Action Conflicts
Conflicts between state regulations and the Sherman Act can
arise from a direct challenge to a state regulation or in the context
of a private antitrust suit in which the defendant claims that state
regulation protects the acts in question. Municipal regulations may
raise similar conflicts.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 23-73. Readers familiar with state action cases,
rules and commentary can move quickly through the section. Slater, Antitrust and Govern-
ment Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U. L. REv. 71 (1974), men-
tions that "in a paper presented to the American Bar Association Antitrust section in 1967,
William Bachelder, a noted antitrust attorney, flatly claimed that there had been a 'dearth'
of comment on Parker v. Brown." Id. at 73 n.12. The dearth certainly has disappeared.
19. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 74-132. Readers familiar with Currie's interest
analysis and conflicts terminology can move quickly through the second portion.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 133-282.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 283-323.
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1. Protection from enforcement of state regulation
A party may seek protection against enforcement of a state law
by claiming that the enforcement would conflict with the Sherman
Act. The state may contend that despite possible conflict with the
federal antitrust laws, enforcement is permissible because the state
policy is eligible for "state action" protection.
a. Parker v. Brown
Parker v. Brown,23 which firmly entrenched the state action doc-
trine, is the classic example of a challenge to a state regulation on
the ground that it conflicts with the Sherman Act.24 In Parker, a
California statute commanded raisin producers to adhere to indus-
try-established price and output levels.2 5 A raisin producer, wish-
ing to sell at other than the prescribed levels, claimed that the law
violated and therefore was preempted by the Sherman Act.26
23. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
24. 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987); Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S.
654 (1982); and Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951) are also
examples of challenges to state regulations on the grounds that they conflict with the Sher-
man Act.
In 324 Liquor, the Sherman Act preempted a New York statute that required its liquor
retailers to charge no less than 112% of the wholesale price per bottle, effectively imposing a
minimum resale price. The regulation enforced a system of resale price maintenance in con-
flict with the Act. 479 U.S. at 341-43.
In Rice, a California statute enforcing liquor distillers' decisions to prevent "unauthorized
wholesaler[s] from obtaining the distiller's products from outside the distiller's established
distribution chain," 458 U.S. at 661, was not preempted by the Sherman Act. The Court
concluded that although the authorized restraints might have an anticompetitive effect, the
regulation itself did not authorize violations of the Act, so the law need not be preempted.
Id. at 661-62.
In Schwegmann, the Court found a Louisiana regulation that in effect compelled all Loui-
siana liquor dealers to adhere to resale prices set by the producer to be in conflict with the
Sherman Act. The law prohibited any liquor dealer from selling particular brands at a price
lower than the lowest price specified in signed resale price maintenance agreements between
the producer and its dealers. 341 U.S. at 395.
25. Parker, 317 U.S. at 346-48. The California regulation required all raisin producers
within a particular zone to conform to a price and production program if 65% of the pro-
ducers competing in the zone consented to that program. Id. at 346-47.
26. Id. at 348-49. Absent state action immunity, an industry-wide agreement to adhere to
price and output levels would violate section 1 of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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The United States Supreme Court recognized the apparent con-
flict between the regulation and the Sherman Act, 7 but did not
preempt the California Act. The Court dodged the conflict and
permitted California to keep its regulation by interpreting the
Sherman Act to be inapplicable to all "state action."28 Under this
interpretation, a state cannot violate the Sherman Act and the
Sherman Act cannot preempt state acts.29 The Court based its in-
terpretation on the lack of an affirmative statement in the Act or
in its legislative history that the Act applied to state acts30 and on
a desire to promote "principles of federalism and state sover-
eignty"'" that impliedly reside in the Sherman Act.32
b. What constitutes state action?
The Parker state action immunity doctrine thus requires defini-
tions of state acts and identification of who can undertake them.3
27. 317 U.S, at 350.
28. Id. at 352.
29. See id. at 350-52; see also Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567-68 (1984); California
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1980); Bates v. State
Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 359 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788
(1975).
30. 317 U.S. at 350-51.
31. Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1662 (1988) (interpreting Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-
51). Accord 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335-43 (1987); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 39 (1985).
32. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-51. Accord Patrick, 108 S. Ct. at 1662; Town of Hallie,
471 U.S. at 38; Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 56
(1985); Hoover, 466 U.S. at 567; City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
389, 412 (1978).
33. If a state itself has done the act in question, the act is a state action and ipso facto
immune. Hoover, 466 U.S. at 567-68. In some cases, however, challenged activity is under-
taken not by a state official, but rather by a nonlegislative instrumentality of the state. For
example, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), two Arizona attorneys who
were suspended from the Arizona State Bar for advertising their prices for legal services
argued that the Bar's ethical rules proscribing such advertisements violated the Sherman
Act. Id. at 350. The Supreme Court concluded that suspension actions undertaken by the
Arizona Supreme Court in its capacity as regulator of lawyers in the state constituted state
action immune from the Sherman Act. Id. at 362-63. (Bates also held, on first amendment
grounds, that attorney advertising could not be "subjected to blanket suppression." Id. at
383). Similarly, in Hoover, a candidate denied admission to the Arizona Bar accused the
Arizona Supreme Court's Committee on Examinations and Admissions of violating the anti-
trust laws. 466 U.S. at 558. The Supreme Court concluded that the conduct challenged "was
in reality that of the Arizona Supreme Court" and thus was state action exempt from Sher-
man Act liability. Id. at 573. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), how-
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i. Clear articulation and active supervision
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Alumi-
num,34 the Supreme Court instituted the current two-pronged test
for state action: a regulatory activity is state action, and thus not
subject to liability or preemption, if the activity required or au-
thorized by the regulation is (1) "clearly articulated and affirma-
tively expressed as state policy" and (2) "'actively supervised' by
the State itself." 5 The Court applied the clear authorization/active
supervision test to a California regulation that required wholesale
wine distributors to adhere to a resale price schedule established
by wine producers, 3  and ultimately enjoindd enforcement of the
law. The regulation impermissibly conflicted with the Sherman Act
policy of per se illegality for resale price maintenance37 and was
not eligible for state action immunity. California had clearly ar-
ticulated its resale price maintenance ("RPM") policy, but its fail-
ure to actively supervise the RPM activity left the statute subject
to preemption.3
ii. Threshold inquiry
The Supreme Court has indicated that prior to assessing clear
articulation and active supervision, a court must make a threshold
inquiry to determine if the state regulation is "inconsistent with
ever, a Fairfax County, Virginia bar association published a fee schedule, and the Virginia
State Bar published ethical opinions suggesting strongly that an attorney's failure to abide
by such a schedule would be misconduct. Id. at 775-76. The Supreme Court concluded that
this bar activity was not state action, however, because it was not undertaken by the state,
and thus was unprotected. Id. at 788-92.
34. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
35. Id. at 105 (citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410
(1978)). Both a state and a private party using the state law to force behavior presumably
will face the same test. Midcal, by the time it reached the Supreme Court, was actually a
private party trying to use the state statute to bar the activity; the state filed an amicus
brief. Id. at 98. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951), also
involved a private attempt to enforce state regulations.
36. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 97. Wholesalers who did not adhere faced fines and license sus-
pension or revocation. Id. at 100. The protesting wine wholesaler sold Gallo wine without
conforming to the Gallo resale price schedule. Id.
37. Id. at 106. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984); Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 407 (1911).
38. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105.
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the antitrust laws."39 In other words, does the state plan, absent
state action immunity, involve a Sherman Act violation? If the an-
swer is no, the challenge to the state regulation fails, and no fur-
ther inquiry follows. If the answer is yes, however, the Sherman
Act will preempt the state regulation unless it meets the require-
ments for state action immunity.40
2. Protection from antitrust liability
The federal-state conflict also can arise without a direct chal-
lenge to a state regulation in an antitrust suit between private par-
ties or in suits brought by the Antitrust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice against a private party. Using "state action" as a
defense, a defendant may claim that a state policy sanctioned her
actions, thus making the acts "state actions" immune from anti-
trust liability. Two fairly recent examples are Southern Motor
Carriers Rate Conference v. United States41 and Patrick v.
Burget.42
In Southern Motor Carriers, several southern states required
truckers to submit their intrastate rates to its Public Utilities
Commission for approval. Each of the states also permitted (but
did not require) the truckers to collectively set those rates. The
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice sued the truckers,
claiming that the collective ratemaking was a per se violation of
the Sherman Act. The truckers argued that their acts were pro-
tected state actions.43
The Supreme Court indicated that the reasoning used in Parker
to find immunity for state action justified the extension of immu-
nity to private parties who were undertaking "state action" as
well.44 Consequently, private parties can use state action as a de-
fense, but immunity for the actions will not be given unless they
39. 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 341 (1987); Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458
U.S. 654, 659 (1982); see also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943); Midcal, 445 U.S. at
102 ("The threshold question is whether California's plan.., violates the Sherman Act"); P.
AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, 81-83 (Supp. 1987).
40. Rice, 458 U.S. at 659, 661, 662 n.9.
41. 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
42. 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988).
43. 471 U.S. at 50-51.
44. Id. at 56.
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prove both prongs of the Midcal standard: (1) the existence of a
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy of dis-
placing competition and (2) active state supervision of the activ-
ity.4 5 In Southern Motor Carriers, the Supreme Court found both
prongs to be satisfied and granted immunity.46
Patrick reached an opposite result. The case involved an Oregon
physician who successfully demonstrated to a jury that certain
other doctors had instituted peer-review activities designed to ter-
minate his hospital privileges for anticompetitive reasons.4 7 The
jury found that the doctors had violated sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. The defendants, however, argued that the Oregon
health policy mandating peer-review procedures at hospitals
shielded their acts from Sherman Act liability.48 Without assessing
clear articulation, the Supreme Court concluded that the activities
undertaken by the defendents were not actively supervised by the
state, and thus could not be considered state action.49 The Sher-
man Act was fully applicable to the doctors' actions.50
3. The effect of municipal regulations
A municipality also may enact or implement regulations that in-
terfere with market rivalry. Consequently, a party may seek to
45. Id. at 57. State regulation is not preempted automatically if the Midcal showing fails.
The regulation may survive, but it does not enable the firms affected by the regulation to
engage in activity that violates the Sherman Act. See e.g., Patrick, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988)
(the state statute requiring peer review was not preempted, but the defendents were liable
because the state did not clearly supervise the activities found to violate the antitrust laws).
46. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 55-56. The Court concluded that even though
the states did not compel the collective ratemaking, subjecting the practice to antitrust lia-
bility would frustrate state policy. The clear articulation requirement was satisfied because
state legislators had "clearly sanctioned" collective ratemaking. Id. at 62-65. The govern-
ment did not contest active supervision. Id. at 62, 66.
47. 108 S. Ct. at 1661.
48. Id. at 1663-64.
49. Id. at 1665-66.
50. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), also fits into the category of a
private defendant trying to use state regulation as a defense to Sherman Act liability. In
Cantor, a regulated utility unsuccessfully argued that a tied sale of light bulbs and electrical
power, claimed by an unregulated light bulb seller plaintiff to be in violation of the Sherman
Act, was shielded from antitrust liability because the tied sale procedure had been approved
by the Michigan Public Service Committee. Id. at 598.
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avoid enforcement of the municipal ordinance by claiming that the
Sherman Act preempts enforcement.
In Fisher v. City of Berkeley,51 Berkeley landlords, unenthusias-
tic about submitting to locally enacted rent-control ordinances, ar-
gued that the ordinances removed price competition in the rental
market and consequently were incompatible with the Sherman
Act.5 2 The Supreme Court, however, disagreed. The Court indi-
cated that the threshold inquiry of whether the regulation involves
an antitrust violation is appropriate for municipal as well as state
regulations challenged under the Sherman Act, and in Fisher the
answer was no.5 3 According to the Court, the Berkeley ordinance
affected the competitive nature of the market, but did not require
any action that would violate the Sherman Act, and was thus not
subject to preemption." The Court did not evaluate state action
immunity.55
If the threshold inquiry reveals a violation, however, the ques-
tion of whether the municipal regulation will be preempted or
given immunity must be resolved. Cities have argued that because
they are governmental entities, their actions are protected under
the Parker interpretation of the Sherman Act, and should be given
"municipal action" immunity. In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co.," two cities sued certain electric utilities, and
one of the utilities counterclaimed that the cities had violated the
Sherman Act by conspiring to exclude the utility from certain mar-
kets.5 7 The cities argued that their behavior was state action and
thus was not subject to antitrust liability. The Supreme Court
held, however, that the municipalities were not eligible for a "mu-
nicipal action" immunity. The state action immunity developed in
51. 475 U.S. 260 (1986).
52. Id. at 263.
53. Id. at 265.
54. Id. at 270.
55. Id. The Supreme Court thus did not actually decide if the municipal ordinance was
state action; it applied the threshold inquiry of Rice and concluded that because the rent
control regulations lacked elements of an agreement crucial to Sherman Act section 1 viola-
tions, they were not in conflict with the antitrust laws. Id.
56. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
57. The cities claimed that the defendant had violated the antitrust laws. Id. at 392 nn.5,
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Parker, based in federalism and sovereignty, applied only to
states.5 8
Consequently, no municipal action exemption exists. Unless the
municipal actions reflect state policy, municipalities are subject to
Sherman Act liability and their regulations are subject to preemp-
tion, even if the municipality clearly articulates its policy and ac-
tively supervises the activity in question.59
In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,60 however, the Supreme
Court indicated that although municipalities are not eligible for
the deference given to states they do not face the same obstacles as
private citizens, either. According to the Court, to be considered
state action, a municipal action must satisfy the first half of the
Midcal test: the municipality must have acted "pursuant to a
clearly expressed state policy."'" A showing that state policy au-
thorizes the municipality "to displace competition with regulation
58. Id. at 408. The Supreme Court concluded that for purposes of protection from the
Sherman Act activity undertaken or authorized by a municipality was different from activ-
ity undertaken or authorized by a state. The Cburt in Parker had based immunity on a need
to avoid intruding on the states as sovereign because of "our 'dual system of government'."
Id. at 412 (citing Parker, 317 U.S. at 351). Extension of immunity to municipalities was
inconsistent with Parker because "[c]ities are not themselves sovereign; they do not receive
all the federal deference of the States that create them." Id. The Court decided that actions
by municipalities do not necessarily reflect state policy. To constitute state action, the mu-
nicipal activity must be authorized by a specific state policy to displace competition with
regulation. Id. at 412-13.
59. See also Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982). The
City of Boulder, Colorado enacted regulations prohibiting a cable television firm from ex-
panding its service area. The regulations were effective for a period during which the city
sought applications from other cable television service providers to provide service in an
area where the plaintiff wished to expand. Id. at 43-46. The plaintiff not only wished to
avoid enforcement of the ordinance but also claimed that the city was liable for a Sherman
Act violation. Id. at 47. The city argued, but to no avail, that the home rule provisions of the
Colorado Constitution specifically authorized all of their municipal actions and thus made
this ordinance state action. Id. The home rule provision alone did not transform the cable
regulation into state action. Id. at 53.
60. 471 U.S. 34 (1985). In Town of Hallie, unincorporated townships sued the City of Eau
Claire, claiming the city had acquired a monopoly over sewage disposal and refused to pro-
vide the townships with sewage services in violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at 36-37. Wis-
consin statutes authorized the city to be a sewage disposal service provider and to deny
service to unincorporated locations, however, and the city convinced the Supreme Court
that those regulations transformed the municipal action into state action insulated from
antitrust liability. Id. at 47.
61. Id. at 40 (emphasis added).
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or monopoly public service '6 2 is sufficient. A municipality that
meets the first half of the Midcal test need not demonstrate that
the state actively supervises the municipal action, however, appar-
ently because municipalities are presumed to act in the public
interest.63
B. Dissatisfaction with the Current Doctrine
Much of the recent literature concerning state action has ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the current doctrine. The various pro-
posals for resolution of the problem, however, differ markedly.
Some critics find state regulation to be frequently inefficient or
anticompetitive. Consistent with a politically popular deregulation
theme, they contend that such regulations are inconsistent with
federal policy and should be preempted.6 4 At least one commenta-
tor has proposed that state regulation should be allowed as protec-
tion against federal antitrust enforcement only when the state reg-
ulation corrects a market failure.6 5 Another has proposed that state
regulations enacted by "captured" legislators should not be al-
lowed to negate federal antitrust enforcement if the regulations
62. Id. at 38-39 (citing Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 413).
63. Id. at 46-47. Elimination of the active supervision requirement for municipalities pre-
sumably applies only to cases in which the municipality is the actor doing an act that might
violate the antitrust laws. Suppose, for example, that a state explicitly authorizes a city to
regulate liquor distribution in that city, and the city promptly enacts a regulation identical
to the regulation preempted in Midcal. If no active state supervision is necessary, would
such a regulation be valid if enacted by a municipality pursuant to state authorization, al-
though it would be preempted if enacted by a state directly? That would, of course, be a
nonsensical result, perhaps more nonsensical than the conclusion in Lafayette that state
action will accommodate a state because it is sovereign but not accommodate a municipal-
ity, because a municipality is somehow less sovereign. In addition, presumably a private
party seeking protection for actions taken pursuant to a municipal ordinance will receive the
protection only if the acts are pursuant to a municipal regulation that was authorized by the
state and the activity is actively supervised by the state.
64. Cirace, supra note 6; Conant, supra note 6; Posner, The Proper Relationship Between
State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 643 (1974); Werden &
Balmer, supra note 6; Wiley, supra note 6. Others simply advocate using preemption analy-
sis rather than immunity analysis. See City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 60 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting); Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1378 (1987); Hovenkamp &
Mackerron, Municipal Regulation and Federal Antitrust Policy, 32 UCLA L. REv. 719, 778-
79 (1985); Note, Parker v. Brown: A Preemption Analysis, 84 YALE L.J. 1164, 1177 (1975).
65. See Cirace, supra note 6, at 486; see also Spitzer, Antitrust Federalism and Rational
Choice Political Economy: A Critique of Capture Theory, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1293, 1318-20
(1988); Wiley, supra note 6, at 743, 748, 762-64.
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benefit producers and do not respond to a substantial ineffi-
ciency.6 6 Others contend that conflicting local regulations should
be preempted unless a federal court finds the municipality to be
the optimal regulatory level.6 7
Some critics argue that state autonomy values outweigh substan-
tive Sherman Act policies. Consistent with a politically popular
theme of minimization of federal control of society, these commen-
tators argue that if a state wishes to adopt an explicit anticompeti-
tive policy, federal antitrust policies should be subordinate to that
state policy.68 Some commentators seem to find the clear articula-
tion standard useful but reject the active supervision require-
ment. 9 One commentator asserts that as long as the state's deci-
sion to replace the federal antitrust scheme is made "after
competing interest groups have survived the traditional Madi-
sonian gauntlet of legislative procedures, 7 0 federalism values call
for federal deference to the conflicting state law. Others suggest
that a state should be free to regulate in a manner inconsistent
with federal antitrust policies, but only as long as the citizens of
the state bear the entire brunt of any monopoly overcharge that
results from the regulation. Regulations that export the overcharge
should be preempted.71
Some commentators and judges have argued that the appropri-
ate method of resolving conflicts between state regulation and fed-
eral antitrust interests is to balance and pick the weightier inter-
est.7 2 In addition, at least one authority has proposed that the
66. See Wiley, supra note 6, at 739-76.
67. See Hovenkamp & Mackerron, supra note 64, at 724, 765-77.
68. See Lopatka, supra note 5, at 943; Page, supra note 5, at 619; see also Gifford, The
Antitrust State-Action Doctrine After Fisher v. Berkeley, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1257 (1986);
Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and Critique of
the State Action Exemption after Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1099 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process].
69. See, e.g., Lopatka, supra note 5, at 943 (not considering active supervision a necessary
criterion).
70. Page, supra note 5, at 619; see also Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory
Process, supra note 68.
71. See Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. L. & EcoN. 23
(1983); see also Jorde, Antitrust and the New State Action Doctrine: A Return to Deferen-
tial Economic Federalism, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 227, 253-56 (1987).
72. See Slater, supra note 18; Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 605-13 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment); Kennedy, Of Lawyers, Light Bulbs and Raisins: An
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state action distinctions between state regulations and municipal
regulations be abandoned. 3
An obvious conflict exists concerning the resolution of conflicts
between state regulations and the Sherman Act. This Article pro-
poses that Brainerd Currie's interest analysis, already consistent in
certain respects with the current approach and some of the propos-
als by commentators, should be adopted as the appropriate mecha-
nism for resolving "state action" conflicts. Accordingly, the Article
turns to a closer scrutiny of Parker's conflict resolution and to a
description of the interest analysis approach.
II. PREEMPTION, STATE ACTION EXEMPTION, AND INTEREST ANALYSIS
The state action issue presents, in two contexts, a choice of law
question: (1) should a court grant a plaintiff an injunction or dam-
ages for a violation of Sherman Act policies by a defendant whose
acts were compelled or authorized by state law; and (2) should a
court grant a plaintiff an injunction against enforcement of a state
law that appears to conflict with Sherman Act policy.
The results of state action cases have varied; sometimes federal
law has been chosen,74 sometimes state law.75 In Parker v. Brown,"6
for example, the Court indicated that state law was the appropri-
ate choice of law,77 but nevertheless acknowledged that in some
cases federal antitrust policies should prevail despite the presence
Analysis of the State Action Doctrine Under the Antitrust Laws, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 31, 66-
69, 72-74 (1979). See also Davidson & Butters, Parker and Usery: Portended Constitutional
Limits on the Federal Interdiction of Anticompetitive State Action, 31 VAND. L. REv. 579,
592-95 (1978).
73. Community Communications v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 60-71 (1982) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
74. E.g., Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988); 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335
(1987); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); California Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers
Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
75. E.g., Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260 (1986); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 471
U.S. 48 (1985); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984); Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458
U.S. 654 (1982); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341 (1943).
76. 317 U.S. 341.
77. Id. at 368. The outcome was to let state enforcement stand, despite the assumption
that the acts, if done by private parties alone, would violate the Sherman Act.
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of a conflicting state policy. 8 The case thus presented the ques-
tion: under what circumstances should the federal policy apply,
and when should the state policy apply? Methodology for a choice
of law decision therefore is necessary.
A. The State Action Exemption Resolution: Interpreting the
Sherman Act to Contain Federalism Values
1. Parker - Midcal and implied federalism values
The Parker resolution of the federal-state conflicts, and the
more recent amplifications of Parker, are controversial. The case
and its extensions attempt to resolve conflicts between the Sher-
man Act and state policies by interpreting the Sherman Act to im-
pliedly exempt from its application any action undertaken either
by a state or pursuant to a state policy that is articulated clearly
and involves active state supervision." The interpretation reads
into the Sherman Act strong federalism values that subordinate
the Act's purposes to contrary state policies whenever the state
policies are clearly articulated and involve active state supervision
of the activities that conflict with the Sherman Act.
Parker involved an apparent conflict because the state regula-
tion, in an effort to provide stability or increases for raisin prices,
required industry-wide adherence to price and output levels set by
industry participants.81 The state clearly had an interest in assert-
ing its policy towards the plaintiff: if producers were free to depart
from the set levels, the success of the program was jeopardized.2
The Court also explicitly recognized, however, that the industry
agreements concerning price and output, the type of restraints
made per se illegal by section 1 of the Sherman Act, raised a con-
78. Id. at 351 ("a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by
authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful").
79. See, e.g., Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 61 ("The Parker doctrine represents
an attempt to resolve conflicts that may arise between principles of federalism and the goal
of the antitrust laws ... ").
80. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980).
81. Parker, 317 U.S. at 346, 355, 359.
82. Any producer not adhering to the program was subject to criminal and civil liability.
Id. at 347.
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flict. 3 The Court resolved the apparent conflict by concluding that
the Sherman Act should not apply to acts by a sovereign.84 Conse-
quently, the state regulation could not conflict with the federal law
and stood in harmony with the Sherman Act.85 Preemption was
unnecessary.
Thirty-seven years later, California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n
v. Midcal Aluminum"' added a limiting definition of when an act
falls within Parker's protection for sovereign acts. Presumably to
ensure that Parker was to be used only to advance the federalism
value of avoiding nullification of state powers, Midcal required
clear articulation of the state policy and active state supervision of
the activity that conflicted with the Sherman Act as prerequisites
to immunity.87
The Parker-Midcal technique of skirting the federal-state con-
flict by interpreting the Sherman Act to contain federalism values
avoids the operation of the supremacy clause. 8 If a court perceives
that the state policy "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,"8 9
83. Id. at 350.
84. Id. at 351-52. The Court defined the regulatory program as state activities. Id. at 352.
85. Id. at 352. Using interest analysis terminology, the case was decided as a false conflict
in favor of state law. According to the Court's interpretation of the Sherman Act, the federal
government did not have an interest in applying the Sherman Act policy to these particular
acts, even though it had an interest in prohibiting industry-wide price and output agree-
ments. California had an interest in applying its policy to the plaintiff, and was allowed to
do so. Of course, the Court in Parker neither undertook a proper interest analysis (although
the point of this Article is that it probably should have) or employed interest analysis
terminology.
86. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
87. Id. at 104-05.
88. Article 6, clause 2 contains the supremacy clause:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONsT. art. VI. The Constitution does not preclude states from passing economic legis-
lation. The clause, however, requires federal law to supersede state law in the event of a
conflict. See generally Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); Conant, supra
note 6, at 259-261; Werden & Balmer, supra note 6, at 40-45; Note, supra note 64, at 1167-
69. The clause establishes the primacy of federal law, ensuring a uniform national result and
a national policy in those circumstances in which Congress has adopted a policy.
89. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
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the court cannot decide that federal policy should be subordinated
to the state policy.90 The supremacy clause requires preemption of
the state policy in such a case. Accordingly, if a state regulatory
policy frustrates Sherman Act policy, the court cannot give the
state regulation deference. An assertion that federalism values and
the desire to give deference to state sovereignty are a part of fed-
eral Sherman Act policy, however, avoids the conflict with federal
law, and possible preemption.91
2. Is the "antitrust federalism" interpretation of the Act
supportable?
Parker described the Sherman Act's federalism values as con-
sisting of noninterference with "a state's control over its officers
and its agents." 92 The absence of congressionally expressed intent
to use the Sherman Act to interfere, combined with an apparent
belief that preemption would do so, was evidence to the Court that
federal policy did not extend so far."
Many writers have echoed the fear that preemption of state reg-
ulations that conflict with the substantive policies of the Sherman
Act might radically interfere with a state's ability to govern. Pro-
fessor Jorde has described the Court's willingness to imply strong
federalism values into the Sherman Act as a judicially crafted ac-
90. For arguments that the supremacy clause seems to have been ignored or misapplied in
Parker, see Conant, supra note 6, at 261-63; Davidson & Butters, supra note 72, at 579-80;
Werden & Balmer, supra note 6, at 40-45.
91. It might be at least semantically tempting to describe state action cases as raising an
actual conflict between a state regulatory policy and the Sherman Act, to be resolved by
some type of balancing; when does "federalism" dictate deference to the state policy that
conflicts with federal policy? See, e.g., Page, supra note 5, at 622 (describing the current
state action process to be one where "[d]uly enacted, explicit [state] legislation in conflict
with federal antitrust law" is nevertheless given deference if it has been authoritatively and
democratically enacted); id. at 628 ("[a]n explicit legislative choice in conflict with the anti-
trust laws is entitled to greater deference.. ."). Such a phrasing of the issue is problematic,
however, because the supremacy clause does not permit deference to a state policy that
conflicts with the purposes and objectives of federal policy. See, e.g., Conant, supra note 6,
at 261-64; Werden & Balmer, supra note 6, at 42-45, 59-62. If a proper level of deference is
to be considered, it must be done within the context of considering the proper interpreta-
tion of the Sherman Act; to what extent does the Sherman Act itself contain a federal policy
of deference to state regulation that conflicts with substantive Sherman Act policies?
92. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
93. Id. at 351-52.
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commodation designed to avoid "wholesale invalidation of state
regulatory regimes." 9s He recently praised the federalism interpre-
tation of the Sherman Act because that resolution furthers federal-
ism values of citizen participation, government efficiency, creative
experimentation, and diffusion of power.95 Professor Verkuil has
described state action immunity as necessary to avoid imposition
of intrusions by the federal judiciary into state regulatory auton-
omy that are analogous to Lochnerian substantive due process
intrusions."'
In support of the antitrust federalism interpretation of the Sher-
man Act, the Court in Parker pointed out that the Act is explicitly
applicable to persons and corporations without mentioning "the
state as such, ' 97 and that the legislative history contained "no sug-
gestion of a purpose to restrain state action." 98 The federalism in-
terpretation, therefore, was based on a negative inference rather
than on positive statements that the Act cannot preempt state
regulation.
94. Jorde, supra note 71, at 227-28.
95. Id. at 230-34.
96. See Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v.
Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 328 (1975) (arguing that using the Sherman Act to preempt con-
flicting state law is "more akin" to substantive due process than to normal preemption re-
view, and thus must be done cautiously). See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see
also Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political Process,
96 YALE L.J. 466, 509-10 (1986). The analogy to Lochner is too long a leap, however. Loch-
ner provided the federal judiciary with the opportunity to review state regulation for its
reasonableness, appropriateness, legitimacy, and directness of relation between the means
and the ends. Substantive due process review was not constrained to the limits of any con-
gressional policy or guidelines for how to make such a review. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In con-
trast, Sherman Act preemption requires the judiciary to determine the congressionally en-
acted federal policy, and then compare the state regulation with the federal policy to ensure
that the state policy does not frustrate the objectives of the federal policy. Granted, the
Sherman Act is very general, and thus Congress has given the federal judiciary considerable
discretion concerning definition of the federal antitrust policy, but the judiciary is neverthe-
less constrained by the limits of the federal policy, as originally established by Congress.
Such a review is thus far more specific and leaves less room for judicial intrusion into state
policy; intrusion extends no further than the federal policy. See Wiley, Revision and Apol-
ogy in Antitrust Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1277, 1289 (1987). But see Hovenkamp & Mack-
erron, supra note 64, at 721 (arguing that the Sherman Act, rather than a specific federal
regulatory standard, is a much more generally expressed federal preference for unrestrained
markets, requiring different treatment).
97. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943).
98. Id. "[A]n unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents
is not lightly to be attributed to Congress." Id.
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Conversely, however, neither the Sherman Act nor its legislative
history expressly authorizes states to adopt conflicting regulation."
The fact that state authority may suffer is not strong support for
the federalism interpretation; some interference with state control
is inevitable whenever federal and state regulations conflict. The
implied interference value is simply a facet of the true conflict that
arises when federal and state policies are inconsistent; it does not
alone dictate that competing state policies should override federal
policies.100
Nor is interpreting the Sherman Act to contain federalism values
that significantly limit the ability of the federal government to re-
quire conformance to the Act constitutionally mandated. Congres-
sional power to enact the Sherman Act stems from Congress'
power to regulate interstate commerce.0 1 As long as Congress has
the constitutional power to fully regulate an activity or industry, 02
federalism does not entitle a state to adopt a clearly articulated
and actively supervised but different policy. The fact that the
Sherman Act exercises less than total control does not suggest that
a state is free to depart from federal policy. Similarly, the tenth
99. Hovenkamp & Mackerron, supra note 64, at 767 ("nothing in the legislative history of
the antitrust laws either creates or forecloses a 'state action' exemption"); Garland, supra
note 96, at 511; Slater, supra note 18, at 83; Spitzer, supra note 65, at 1295; Werden &
Balmer, supra note 6, at 49-56. Determining what the original authors had in mind, often a
useful but not determinative piece of information in any event, is not useful to decide the
extent to which states and municipalities are free from Sherman Act policy. At the time of
enactment, the state action issue was not considered, no doubt because Congress did not
believe that it had the constitutionally granted regulatory power to regulate intrastate activ-
ity. See, e.g., Hovenkamp & Mackerron, supra note 64, at 725; Spitzer, supra note 65, at
1295-96. When congressional power was identified as more expansive, the reach of the Sher-
man Act expanded as well, creating the state action question.
100. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 479-81 (2d ed. 1988) concerning how to
interpret federal law when undertaking preemption analysis. See also Conant, supra note 6;
Werden & Balmer, supra note 6 (both arguing that the supremacy clause has been improp-
erly ignored in determinations of state action immunity, but not discussing specifically
whether the interference value justifies overriding the federal policy). But see Lopatka,
supra note 5; Page, supra note 5; (both arguing that the Sherman Act should not interfere
with at least legislatively implemented state regulation).
101. See, e.g., L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 708-12 (1977). The Sher-
man Act extends to all activity that Congress has constitutional power under the commerce
clause to regulate. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219 (1948).
102. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943); Hovenkamp & Mackerron, supra
note 64, at 759.
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amendment, which reserves to the states all powers not delegated
to Congress or prohibited to the states, does not significantly limit
the Sherman Act's control over state activity.103 The amendment
does not suggest that in the absence of express indication to the
contrary, all federal laws contain implicit permission for a state to
assume a different and contradictory regulatory scheme.
The Parker-Midcal conclusion that federalism values within the
Sherman Act mandate an exemption for some state regulations
that conflict with federal antitrust policy competes with the
supremacy clause. 04 The interpretation resolves the potential fed-
eral-state conflict by injecting into the Sherman Act a federalism
component so powerful that it renders unobjectionable state
schemes that may depart radically from, and therefore serve as ob-
stacles to, the federal regulatory antitrust scheme. It permits any
state to circumvent local application of the Act totally by a clear
statement and active supervision. In contravention of a uniform
federal policy, the interpretation allows each state to define the
scope of federal Sherman Act policy.10 5 Such an interpretation of
federal policy, derived from a fear of interference and a negative
inference, is not justified by the language of the Act, the legislative
history, or the purposes of the Act.'0 6
B. Currie's Interest Analysis as an Alternative Method of Accom-
modating Preemption and Federalism Values
The tension between the Sherman Act and state regulation can
be resolved without assuming that the federal law is designed to
103. The tenth amendment at times has been considered to preclude the federal govern-
ment from interfering with a basic state service that is "essential to [the] separate and inde-
pendent existence" of the states. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845-51
(1976). The tenth amendment as it is currently interpreted is not a limitation on the Sher-
man Act, however. See Hovenkamp & Mackerron, supra note 64, at 745-46. In any event,
the Sherman Act would not intrude on the basic functions of a state government except in
the highly unlikely event that a local economic regulation is defined to be essential to the
independent existence of the state. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 100, at 378-400.
104. See P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at 103-04; Conant, supra note 6, at
270-71; Hovenkamp & Mackerron, supra note 64, at 725-28, 778; Kennedy, supra note 72, at
33-34; Slater, supra note 18, at 83; Werden & Balmer, supra note 6, at 59.
105. See Hovenkamp & Mackerron, supra note 64, at 724 ("the doctrine unwisely cedes
to the states an important question of federal subject matter jurisdiction: What is the ap-
propriate scope of the federal antitrust laws?").
106. See Conant, supra note 6; Werden & Balmer, supra note 6.
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undermine itself. An interest analysis, proposed by Brainerd Cur-
rie for resolution of litigation involving the apparently conflicting
laws of different states,0 7 can accommodate state autonomy and
federalism concerns without unnecessarily restricting federal anti-
trust policy.'0
1. Currie's interest analysis
Currie's interest analysis arose out of his dissatisfaction with the
choice of law process based on territorial rules (such as the law of
the place of tort or contract) found in the 1934 Restatement and
generally applied."0 9 He pointed out that the rules worked "in irra-
tional ways, by nullifying capriciously the interest of one state or
another whose laws were said to be in conflict without analysis of
their underlying policies." 10
107. See generally B. CURRIE, supra note 12. See also R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY,
CONFLIcT OF LAWS (3d ed. 1981); Kay, Use of Comparative Impairment to Resolve True
Conflicts: An Evaluation of the California Experience, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 577 (1980); Sedler,
The Governmental Interest Approach To Choice of Law: An Analysis and a Reformation,
25 UCLA L. REV. 181 (1977); Symposium: Conflict of Laws, 34 MERCER L. REV. 471 (1983).
108. The choice of law implications inherent in preemption cases are identified in R.
CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 107, at 952-53 ("[T]he question in such cases is
the familiar choice-of-law problem of accommodating conflicting governmental interests:
Does the purpose of the federal law require subordination of state policy?") Although appli-
cation of Currie's interest analysis to these choice of law problems is not explicitly handled,
the suggestion of doing so is unavoidable. In addition, at least somewhat similar approaches
(that do not discuss Currie's interest analysis approach) have been proposed by Conant,
supra note 6; Garland, supra note 96; Werden & Balmer, supra note 6; Note, supra note 64;
and, more recently, to some extent, by Professor Spitzer, who calls for development of a
state action doctrine that is based on whether state laws conflict with the purposes of the
antitrust laws. Spitzer, supra note 65, at 1318. Professor Wiley also proposes to identify a
federal interest and preempt those state regulations in conflict. Wiley, supra note 96.
109. See Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REV. 521,
539 (1983); Sedler, supra note 107, at 181. Currie was not the only one dissatisfied. Roger
Traynor described the Restatement approach to be a "petrified forest." Traynor, Is This
Conflict Necessary?, 37 TEx. L. REV. 657, 670 n.35 (1959).
110. B. CURRIE, supra note 12, at 180-81. Somewhat mirroring Currie's frustration with a
rule oriented choice of law process, many commentators have expressed a belief that state
action clear articulation and active supervision "rules" are causing perverse results. See, e.g.,
Wiley, supra note 6, at 733-36 (discussing the effect of the clear articulation requirement as
generating ineffective and costly state and local behavior); Cirace, supra note 6, at 519; Co-
nant, supra note 6, at 279-281; Hovenkamp & Mackerron, supra note 64, at 765, 782; Page,
Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process, supra note 68, at 1126-30.
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In the place of territorial rules, Currie offered his interest analy-
sis framework."1 The framework, designed to accommodate the in-
terests of all states, had a basis in federalism: it could eliminate
unnecessary intrusions into the policies and goals of each state."'
Interest analysis involves evaluation of the possibly applicable
rules of involved states to determine whether the policy underlying
each rule is furthered by its application to the dispute. If a state's
policy is furthered by application of its rule, the state is interested.
Only when more than one state has an interest must the forum
choose between them.113
The first step is to identify, for each involved jurisdiction, the
rule and the policy the rule seeks to implement."4 Underlying poli-
cies are revealed by the problem that instigated enactment, the
place of the rule in the state's overall regulatory scheme, and the
benefits to the state community that will be achieved by employing
the rule."15
The second step is to determine if a state has an interest in an
application of its rule to the dispute at hand."' A state is not nec-
essarily interested because its rule might apply, or because the
111. B. CURRIE, supra note 12, at 177-87. See also R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY,
supra note 107, at 216-19; Sedler, supra note 107, at 183.
112. Currie argued that the conflict of laws rules created false problems, solved them in
irrational ways, and often nullified state interests without "reference to the merits of the
respective policies and even without recognition of their existence." B. CURRIE, supra note
12, at 180. Interest analysis thus was designed to promote federalism values by recognizing
the existence of the policies and interests of all involved states and when possible eliminat-
ing the needless nullification of one state's policies by another's. He did not believe an "as-
sessment of the respective values of the competing legitimate interests of two sovereign
states, in order to determine which is to prevail" should be undertaken by the judiciary. Id.
at 182. Absent a legislative solution, each state should be free to further its own legitimate
interest, when invoking its rule would do so. Id. at 177-87.
113. R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 107, at 237-40.
114. B. CURRIE, supra note 12, at 183-84; see R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra
note 107, at 216-17; Sedler, supra note 107, at 183.
115. Ratner, Choice of Law: Interest Analysis and Cost- Contribution, 47 S. CAL. L. REV.
817, 819 (1974).
116. B. CURRIE, supra note 12, at 183-84 ("This process is essentially the familiar one of
construction or interpretation.") See also R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note
107, at 217; Sedler, supra note 107, at 183. The process is not without its critics. See, e.g., A.
EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1967); Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the
Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REv. 392 (1980); Ehrenzweig, "False Conflicts" and
the "Better Rule": Threat and Promise in Multistate Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 847 (1967).
See also Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A Re-
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state has a general interest in the subject matter of the dispute, or
because a resident of the state is involved in the dispute. 117 A state
has an interest "when application of the state's rule to a dispute
implements the underlying policy that the state has adopted to
promote the welfare of its residents.""'
Using interest analysis, potential conflict situations tend to fall
into one of the following categories: false conflict, apparent conflict
and true conflict." 9
a. False conflicts
Often, if careful analysis reveals that only one state has an inter-
est in the application of its policy, a false conflict is presented. 2 '
No "choice" is required. A dispute should be resolved by the rule
of a state that has an interest rather than one that does not.'2 '
b. Apparent conflicts
If more than one state appears to have an interest, an apparent
conflict exists. 2 2 Currie suggested that before making a choice be-
sponse to the 'New Critics,' 34 MERCER L. REV. 593 (1983) [hereinafter Sedler, Interest
Analysis].
117. Ratner, supra note 115, at 819.
118. Id.
119. If all involved states have the same policy, or if the outcome would not vary depend-
ing on the law chosen, no conflict arises. The choice will in effect not matter. Some have
identified this situation as a false conflict. See Sedler, supra note 107, at 186 n.38.
120. R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 107, at 222-37, 245-51; B. CURRIE,
supra note 12, at 184; Ratner, supra note 115, at 819; Sedler, supra note 107, at 186-87. An
example of a false conflict is a situation in which a plaintiff and a defendant in a liability
suit reside in a state that allows recovery for the action, but the action took place in a state
that denies recovery. The state where the action took place has no interest in applying its
nonrecovery rule to the two parties. Sedler, supra note 107, at 186. State action cases are
false conflicts if either the state or the federal government has no interest in applying its
policy to an activity in question.
121. B. CURRIE, supra note 12, at 184; Ratner, supra note 115, at 819. The unprovided-for
case, in which neither jurisdiction is interested in applying its rule to the dispute, has also
been identified. B. CURRIE, supra note 12, at 152; see also Sedler, supra note 107, at 189-90.
122. R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 107, at 217; Sedler, supra note 107, at
187. The situation has also been described as an "apparent true conflict." See Kanowitz,
Comparative Impairment and Better Law: Grand Illusions in the Conflict of Laws, 30 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 255, 256 (1978); Kay, supra note 107, at 578; Kay, supra note 109, at 540; Note,
.Conflict of Laws, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 290, 293 (1977). The term "apparent conflict" (or "appar-
ent true conflict") troubles me because of the ambiguity of the word "apparent." Although
new terminology just for terminology's sake should be avoided, for state action conflicts
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tween the conflicting rules, however, "more moderate and re-
strained interpretation both of the policy and of the circumstances
in which it must be applied"'' s should be undertaken for each con-
flicting policy, to avoid the conflict if possible. 2 " The result may be
a false conflict.
(and perhaps for multistate conflicts as well) I propose "prima facie conflict" as a possible
alternative phrase, because "apparent" has more than one applicable meaning. An apparent
conflict could suggest those conflicts that are easy to see-obvious, or apparent, conflicts.
The implication is that although these conflicts are obvious, others may be lurking but are
not visible to the naked eye. See WEBSTERS THIRD NEW INTL. DICTIONARY 102-03 (1986)
(definition one). Apparent also means seeming, but perhaps not in fact true; under this
meaning, an apparent conflict would be a conflict that appears to be a true conflict, but in
fact (perhaps upon reconsideration?) is not. See id. (definition two and synonym discus-
sion). Although leaning more toward the second definition, "apparent conflict" and "appar-
ent true conflict" arguably employ concepts from both of the definitions. An initial look may
reveal clearly visible conflicts, but some of those conflicts in fact may not be true conflicts. A
"prima facie conflict" is just another way of saying the same thing; there is reason to believe
that a conflict exists, but that reason may disappear on a reconsideration that uses modera-
tion and restraint. I do not mean to propose a change in the underlying analysis. As an
anonymous review pointed out, "prima facie conflict" has the drawback of raising unhelpful
evidentiary connotations.
123. Currie, supra note 17, at 757. See also Kay, supra note 109, at 549. The restrained
interpretation aspect of Currie's process may appear unnecessary. Reconsideration seems
appropriate only if the first analysis may be incomplete or incorrect, in which case a careful,
complete initial analysis would seem to be the more desirable approach. In the absence of an
apparent conflict, however, a more moderate and restrained interpretation may unnecessa-
rily limit the scope of the applicable policy. Such an interpretation, therefore, should be
considered only when a true conflict would otherwise be the result.
124. Currie is usually described as suggesting a moderate and restrained reconsideration
"of the policy or interest of one state or the other." Kay, supra note 107, at 578 (quoting W.
REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 470 (7th ed. 1978)); see
R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE, & H. KAY, supra note 107, at 217. In The Disinterested Third
State, Currie seems to emphasize a reconsideration of the forum policy and interest:
[T]he mere fact that a suggested broad conception of a local interest will create
conflict with that of a foreign state is a sound reason why the conception
should be re-examined, with a view to a more moderate and restrained inter-
pretation both of the policy and of the circumstances in which it must be ap-
plied to effectuate the forum's legitimate purpose.
Currie, supra note 17, at 757. Currie also apparently proposed reconsideration of the poli-
cies of all apparently interested jurisdictions. See B. CURRIE, supra note 12, at 168 ("There
is room for restraint and enlightenment in the determination of what state policy is and
where state interests lie"); W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, supra, at 470 (the authors indicate
that their description of Currie's approach, which includes the "one state or another" lan-
guage quoted above, is taken from material Currie wrote for their use for the fourth edition
of the book.). See also Kanowitz, supra note 122, at 268-73 (arguing that perhaps the reas-
sessment should only apply to the forum policies and interests); Kay, supra note 107, at 597,
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c. True Conflicts
If the attempts at conflict avoidance are unsuccessful, more than
one state has an interest in applying its policy. This true conflict
requires a choice between the policies of the interested states. In
such a case, Currie reluctantly concluded that in the absence of a
forum statutory choice of law rule directing the application of the
rule of another interested state, the forum should apply its own
substantive rule.125  Currie believed that balancing competing
states' functions is a nonjudicial function, and he strongly opposed
judicial attempts to weigh or balanbe the competing interests. 26
According to Currie, true conflicts "cannot be solved by any sci-
ence or method of conflict-of-laws.' 27
n.114 (disagreeing with Kanowitz and arguing the reassessment should apply to all appar-
ently conflicting policies).
There is a reason to focus especially on reconsideration of the forum policy and interest.
Given Currie's rule of choosing forum law in true conflicts, a facile or expansive determina-
tion by the forum court that forum law is interested means that forum law will apply, either
as the law of the only interested jurisdiction in a false conflict or as the applicable law in a
true conflict. The reconsideration of forum policy accommodates foreign interests by ensur-
ing that a selfish and provincial forum has not stretched too broadly its own policy to apply
its rule, and thus serves a federalism value of avoiding unnecessary intrusion by one juris-
diction into the policies of another jurisdiction. In contrast, if the forum implements an
overly moderate and restrained assessment of foreign policy, the method could be used sys-
tematically to find no true conflict and to select forum law. The need for reassessment of the
foreign law accordingly is somewhat less compelling. Applied to state action cases, using a
choice of law rule that requires application of federal law in true conflict cases, the point is
that anti-intrusion values should be promoted by undertaking a reassessment of federal law
using moderation and restraint prior to preempting a state law that apparently conflicts
with the Sherman Act.
125. B. CURRIE, supra note 12, at 183-84. A state may enact a law that directs its courts to
apply the rule of another interested jurisdiction in the event of a conflict. In that case, the
forum's choice of law rule, rather than the forum's policy that conflicts with a foreign state's
policy, is chosen. The supremacy clause is such a rule for all federal-state conflicts, directing
state as well as federal courts to choose federal law in the event of a conflict.
126. Id. at 181-83. "[A] court is in no position to 'weigh' the competing interests, or evalu-
ate their relative merits, and choose between them accordingly .... [A]ssessment of the
respective values of the competing legitimate interests of two sovereign states, in order to
determine which is to prevail, is a political function of a very high order. This is a function
that should not be committed to courts in a democracy. It is a function that the courts
cannot perform effectively ... This is a job for a legislative committee." Id. at 181-82; see
also R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 107, at 260-65; Ratner, supra note 115,
at 822 n.20; Sedler, supra note 107, at 216-17.
127. B. CURRIE, supra note 12, at 107; see Kay, supra note 107, at 579. Currie's selection
rule in a true conflict is an acknowledged punt. In the face of an unresolvable conflict, Cur-
rie saw no reason to depart from a presumption that the forum generally does not depart
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2. Interest analysis for state action conflicts
Currie's approach provides an effective system for accommodat-
ing state autonomy without undermining substantive federal anti-
trust interests. Interest analysis can mitigate the conflicts that ap-
pear between state or municipal laws and the Sherman Act. Such
conflicts inevitably require extensive analysis of both state and
federal rules; Currie's system can determine the underlying policies
and identify false conflicts effectively, an approach that is espe-
cially useful for avoiding confrontations between state and federal
laws. Interest analysis also promotes the federalism value of peace-
ful coexistence by avoiding unnecessary stultification of both state
and federal interests. The identification of nonintrusive or consis-
tent policies when they exist avoids the need to choose between
deference and preemption.
Interest analysis, unlike the Parker-Midcal resolution, avoids
stultification of federal antitrust policy and supremacy clause val-
ues.'128 In the presence of a true conflict between the federal Sher-
man Act and state law, the forum, whether a federal or a state
court, must abide by the supremacy clause. The supremacy clause
is an overriding choice of law rule that requires the application of
federal law in both state and federal courts, thereby ensuring a
consistent result.129 Consequently, in true conflicts, as well as in
false conflicts favoring the federal law, the Sherman Act policies
will prevail.
from its own law. Professor Kay argues that the entire choice of law question should be
phrased: "Under what circumstances is a departure from local law justified?" Id. at 617.
128. See B. CURRIE, supra note 12, at 119 (indicating that Currie was unwilling to sacrifice
the advancement of the forum's interest for the sake of multistate concerns).
129. Currie's forum law solution for true conflicts has been criticized, in part because it
promotes uncertainty and forum shopping; the same set of facts might receive different
treatment depending on where the case is brought. See R. CRAMPrON, D. CURIE & H. KAY,
supra note 107, at 260-65; Sedler, supra note 107, at 216-20. Currie hoped that congressional
action would provide a uniform choice of law rule in cases of true conflicts. B. CURRIE, supra
note 12, at 183. The supremacy clause imposes such a rule for all federal-state conflicts,
providing for a uniform resolution regardless of whether the matter arises in a federal or
state court. R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 107, at 272-73. In the event of a
true federal-state conflict, forum law, which is to follow the choice of law rule contained in
the United States Constitution, will be used. Accordingly, one of the major criticisms of
Currie's method is not applicable to its use for resolution of conflicts between state regula-
tions and the Sherman Act.
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Currie's "moderate and restrained reassessment" mechanism for
handling apparent conflicts is especially useful for state action con-
flicts. Unlike the Parker-Midcal state action doctrine, which ac-
commodates state policy at the expense of federal interest, Currie's
system accommodates state interests by building in a restrained
view of the substantive federal antitrust policies. The moderate
and restrained second look serves to implement the preemption
principle that federal law should preempt a state law only when an
irreconcilable conflict exists between the two laws. 130 Many state
regulations raise at least an apparent conflict with the Sherman
Act. But because federal law is the constitutionally directed appli-
cable law in cases of true conflict, an overly expansive view of fed-
eral policy might intrude on state and local regulatory systems
more than is necessary to achieve federal purposes. The moderate
and restrained second look at federal policy appropriately ensures
that the court has made a proper effort to find common ground
between apparently competing policies.13'
Using interest analysis rather than a federalism interpretation of
the Sherman Act to accommodate federalism values also avoids the
process of trying to determine federal policy by balancing state
and federal interests. The balancing process is not consistent with
the supremacy clause and may also impair federalism values if the
balance unnecessarily subordinates nonconflicting state policy to
federal regulation." 2
130. Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982).
131. An essential premise of the need to imply federalism values into the Sherman Act is
that without the interpretation, large amounts of state regulation will be preempted by the
Sherman Act. See, e.g., Jorde, supra note 71, at 227-28. Using interest analysis as the tool
for resolving state action conflicts challenges that assumption. A moderate and restrained
but relatively uncontroversial assessment of federal Sherman Act policy indicates that only
a limited number of regulatory alternatives are denied to the states by the Sherman Act.
See infra text accompanying notes 194-282. The Act need not be interpreted as a vehicle for
preempting virtually all nonfederal regulation of business behavior. Consequently, the feder-
alism interpretation could be dropped without imperiling vast quantities of state and local
regulation.
132. Using interest analysis does not require trying to determine federal policy by balanc-
ing federal and state interests. Currie thought that balancing the interests of various states
was judicially inappropriate; see supra note 126, and the supremacy clause does not permit
such a balancing in the face of actual conflict between state and federal law. See Werden &
Balmer, supra note 6, at 62 n.334. Consequently, although proposed by some as the appro-
priate process for resolving state action conflicts, see supra note 91, the balancing of federal
and state interests is available as a resolution only if federal antitrust policy is defined to be
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III. INTEREST ANALYSIS APPLIED TO STATE ACTION CONFLICTS
When a state action issue arises, the goal should be to determine
whether there is a true conflict between state and federal policies.
When the federal government has an interest in applying Sherman
Act antitrust policies to an activity that falls under a state regula-
tory scheme, but the state has no interest in protecting the activity
from such application, there is a false conflict. Under such a cir-
cumstanice, federal law should be applied, but preemption is un-
necessary. If the state has an interest in permitting an activity but
the federal government has no interest in prohibiting it, a false
conflict also exists, and the state policy of protection should be al-
lowed to continue. In cases of true conflict, created because both
the state and the federal government are interested in applying
contrary policies, federal policy should prevail.
Using this framework will not "require the wholesale invalida-
tion of state regulatory regimes."1 3 It does require a substantive
review of state laws by federal courts, but only for the purpose of
determining whether the laws in fact conflict with Sherman Act
policies."3 This type of review is unavoidable whenever supremacy
clause preemption is an issue.
one of applying only when, on balance, the Sherman Act substantive antitrust values out-
weigh the state values. Such an interpretation of the Sherman Act, however, appears wholly
unsupportable; it would simply be a method of undertaking what the supremacy clause does
not permit.
133. Jorde, supra note 71, at 227-28. Nor will the result interfere with federalism values
of citizen participation, governmental efficiency, creative experimentation and diffusion of
power any more than any other federal law that preempts some forms of state regulation.
See generally id. at 230-34 (identifying these values as promoted by the state action
doctrine).
134. Interest analysis does not require an evaluation of the appropriateness or legitimacy
of state policies, except as to whether the policy conflicts with federal purposes in enacting
the Sherman Act. Nor does it require a general assessment of the reasonableness of state
regulation or of the directness of the relationship between the means of the state regulation
and its regulatory purpose. The judiciary would be required to interpret state and federal
policies with a bias toward the avoidance of a conflict. The values that the federal courts
could use to strike down state laws would be judicially developed assessments of congres-
sional values expressed in the Sherman Act, rather than judicially developed constitutional
values. For better or worse, interest analysis does not call for a return to Lochner.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
A. Sherman Act Policy
Using interest analysis to assess the possible conflict between a
state regulation and the Sherman Act requires identification of the
Sherman Act antitrust policy as applied to the state-regulated ac-
tivity. That identification discloses whether the purposes of the
Act are served by its application in the particular case and whether
the federal government thus has an interest in asserting its policy.
The purposes of federal antitrust regulation have long been the
topic of debate. The Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combina-
tions, and conspiracies in restraint of trade, as well as monopoliza-
tion and attempts to monopolize. 135 The purpose is to remove
some, but not all, impediments to competitive market functioning.
That policy is implemented by preventing competing market par-
ticipants from agreeing to substitute their collective market power
for individual market decisions, and by rendering illegal many ac-
tivities that would enable an individual firm to acquire the ability
to control all or a significant portion of a market. More broadly,
the policy is designed to benefit society in general by enhancing
the efficient use of resources and by reducing the opportunities for
those with economic power to extract wealth from those lacking
the power.
1. Rules
Section I of the Sherman Act prohibits all contracts, combina-
tions and conspiracies in restraint of trade. 136 As judicially con-
strued, this general rule protects market competition by prohibit-
ing agreements between competitors concerning matters that
influence purchaser choice, including price, quality, service, areas
of distribution, and output.13 7 The section forbids agreements that
substitute collective industry judgment for the independent deci-
sions of horizontal competitors. Competitors ordinarily are not al-
lowed to band together, act as a larger unit, and acquire market
power by reducing pressure that otherwise would exist from each
other to offer a lower price, better quality, or larger output.138
135. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
136. Id. § 1.
137. See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 101, ch. 3.
138. See id. at 182-86.
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Accordingly, agreements by competitors to fix or coordinate
prices or quality, restrain output, or allocate territories for compe-
tition, and agreements to facilitate or police such arrangements are
per se violations of the Act.'3 9 Some vertical agreements, such as
resale price maintenance agreements and a narrow set of tied sales,
are also per se illegal.140 Other vertical restraints, such as vertical
territorial allocation, are not per se illegal, but may be found un-
reasonable and thus in violation of the Act, depending on the par-
ticular circumstances of the agreement. 4'
Courts have interpreted section 2, which prohibits monopoliza-
tion, attempt to monopolize, and conspiracy to monopolize, 42 to
forbid efforts by a firm or group of firms to become the sole or the
dominant producer of a product or service by methods other than
price and quality competition. 43 Generally, a firm with a large por-
tion of the market or the potential to acquire a large portion can-
not otherwise exclude or frustrate entry into the market, intention-
ally hasten the exit of a competitor, or hamper a competitor's
ability to compete on similar terms.
2. Policies or purposes
a. Efficiency
One major purpose of protecting competition is to restrict the
ability of firms to act in a manner that enables them to increase
their wealth but results in less efficient use of societal resources. A
firm or group of firms with market power4 4 is likely to exercise the
139. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 101, at 182-86, 311-15.
140. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (tied sales);
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (resale price-
maintenance).
141. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). On the
general legality of vertical restraints, see H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTI-
TRUST LAW 247-72 (1985).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
143. See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 101, ch. 2. In some circumstances, firms are
not permitted to compete by setting a price that is below their own cost, despite the fact
that such an activity is a form of price competition.
144. Market power is the ability to price a product and set an output level in a manner at
least somewhat unconstrained by other producers of the product. A firm with market power
can sustain a price for its product that is higher than the price that would prevail in a
perfectly competitive market.
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power in a manner that tends to misallocate resources.145 The mis-
allocation is the efficiency reason for prohibiting anticompetitive
behavior.146
b. Pro-consumer distribution
Another underlying purpose of protecting competition is to en-
courage a distributive result that places surplus with consumers.147
In a market where firm coordination is not permitted and individ-
ual firms are not allowed to acquire enough power to dominate,
prices theoretically will gravitate towards the lowest price neces-
sary to keep most producers in business. Although many consum-
ers would be willing to surrender a higher price for the product,
the competitive market tends to enable those consumers to pay the
145. See generally F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORM-
ANCE 20-21 (2d ed. 1980). Misallocation occurs due to a reduced industry output. A firm
with market power maximizes profit by charging a price above the price that would exist in
a competitive market. Some people who would have purchased at the (lower) competitively
set price will not purchase at the higher price. These consumers are denied the benefits of
the monopolistically priced product and are forced to do something else with the resources
they would have expended on the competitively priced product, and too few resources are
allocated to the production of the monopolistically priced product. The result is reduced
welfare for the nonpurchasers and an inefficient allocation of resources. The misallocation
theoretically could be avoided if the power-wielding firm perfectly price discriminates, i.e.,
identifies an amount each potential purchaser is willing to pay and manages to sell the en-
tire quantity that would have been purchased at the competitive price. (The seller keeps the
surplus, but output is unaffected.) Even in that highly unlikely event, inefficient expendi-
tures of resources directed toward obtaining or keeping a monopoly may occur. See, e.g.,
Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON 807-27 (1975). An-
other efficiency-related rationale for restricting the ability of firms to obtain market power is
the desire to reduce what is called X-inefficiency. Some economists have argued that firms
not facing competition become less efficient, even though the firms continue to have strong
incentives to reduce costs. See F. SCHERER, supra, at 464-69.
146. The Sherman Act efficiency value also inevitably contains a distributional implica-
tion: to promote the efficient use of resources, some methods that firms would otherwise use
to increase wealth are restricted. A firm behaves in a manner that misallocates resources not
because the firm benefits from the misallocation, but because the distributional benefit to
the firm is large. A profit-maximizing firm that forces a misallocation suffers a tiny loss as a
member of society, but reaps a gain from the monopoly behavior that greatly exceeds the
tiny loss.
147. See, e.g., Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Anti-
trust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982). The pro-con-
sumer distribution value is not generally incompatible or inconsistent with the efficiency
value. Usually, the Sherman Act protection of the competitive process promotes both values
simultaneously.
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lower competitive price and to keep the surplus. As a consequence,
an inevitable effect of protecting a competitive market environ-
ment by prohibiting firm coordination and acquisitions of single-
firm market power is to provide consumers with a distributional
benefit. 148 Similarly, preventing firms from agreeing on price and
quality may provide information and consequent bargaining pro-
tection to unwary consumers unable to ascertain the existence of
competitor agreements.149
c. Small firm autonomy
Protection of competition also may reflect the purpose of pre-
serving the autonomy of small producers. There is historical sup-
port for the argument that the small, independent firm protection
value is present in the Sherman Act. The value, however, is some-
what incompatible with efficiency values also contained in the
Act.1 50
3. Initial inquiry concerning federal interests
In general, when a state regulatory policy interferes with compe-
tition, a federal interest in prohibiting the regulatory activity is
present. In most state action cases, an initial inquiry concerning
148. For an assessment of some of the income distribution effects of monopoly power, see
F. SCHERER, supra note 145, at 471-74.
149. The lack of knowledge could result in wasteful searches and ineffective bargaining.
Prohibiting the agreements thus protects unwary consumers from wasting resources re-
searching products that, due to agreements, are not at all competitive.
150. See, e.g., Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other than Competition and Efficiency,
What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1191, 1196-1200 (1977); see also Blake & Jones, In
Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. Rav. 377, 383 (1984) (discussing the Sherman Act as a
tool for limiting the political power of firms). Because preserving competitive markets often
will result in a market with a large number of smaller firms rather than a small number of
larger firms, the efficiency and distribution values are not inevitably inconsistent with small-
firm populist values. Always favoring smaller independent firms in larger numbers as a
value, however, could lead to the overprotection of inefficiently sized firms, a result that is
inconsistent with the promotion of the efficient use of resources. Both values appear to be
present in the Sherman Act protection of competition, however. See Continental T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 68-69 (1977) (White, J., concurring) (indicating that the
value of protection for the "'autonomy of independent businessmen'.., is without question
more deeply embedded in our cases than the notions of 'free rider' effects and distribution
efficiencies borrowed by the majority from the 'new economics of vertical relationships.'"
Id.). The small- firm autonomy value may be one basis for the continued per se illegality of
resale price maintenance.
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activities falling within the scope of a state regulatory policy
reveals at least a superficial federal interest in prohibiting what the
state regulation requires or authorizes.151
B. State Policy and Interest
Given a federal Sherman Act interest in prohibiting an activity
that falls within a state's regulatory scope, an interest analysis for
state action conflicts must identify the state policy and purposes of
its regulation. The question of whether a Sherman Act policy con-
flicts with a state regulatory policy is answered by determining the
policy underlying the state regulation, the purpose for applying
that policy to the particular case, and whether that application
conflicts with the purposes of the Sherman Act.
Determining whether a state has an interest in protecting an ac-
tivity is not a determination that the act is a "state act" under-
taken by the legislature or some other state agency. A state will
151. In California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980),
and 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987), for example, state regulations enforced
policies of allowing or requiring an owner to dictate the resale price for her item and prohib-
ited deviations from that price. Section 1 of the Sherman Act has been interpreted to make
such restrictions per se illegal. The Act attempts to protect resellers by allowing them to
select the price at which they sell the product free from instructions by the original owners.
Sellers of products are not allowed to require resellers of their products to adhere to owner-
dictated resale prices. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951),
involved a similar federal interest in not allowing distributors and retailers to agree to the
imposition of minimum resale prices on those retailers unwilling to sign resale price mainte-
nance (RPM) agreements. Id. at 388. Signed RPM agreements had been exempted by
Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act of 1937, Aug. 17, 1937, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1982), but the state system enabled a retailer to force all other retailers to conform to a
minimum price, in effect enforcing a retailer cartel. In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943),
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), and Southern Motor Carriers Rate Con-
ference v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985), the Sherman Act policy of prohibiting price
and output agreements among competitors meant that the federal government had an inter-
est in preventing the activities that fell within the scope of state regulation. Bates v. State
Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977), involved agreements by lawyers both to refrain from com-
peting through advertising and to punish those who did not refrain; Sherman Act policy is
to prohibit many of those types of agreements. In Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984), as
well as Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988), and Bates, the Sherman Act policy of
prohibiting group boycotts that hamper or entirely prevent a competitor from competing
raised a federal interest in banning the state-regulated activities. The Sherman Act policy of
prohibiting tied sales agreements and attempts to monopolize raised an interest in prohibit-
ing the defendant utility's alleged tied sale practice in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U.S. 579 (1976).
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always have a policy of some kind toward an activity that falls
within Sherman Act proscriptions. That policy will be reflected by
legislative or judicial statements, decisions or enactments, or the
lack thereof. A state, however, does not have an interest in protect-
ing an activity simply because one of its citizens wishes to engage
in the activity or because the state generally regulates in the area.
The question is whether state policies will be furthered by pro-
tecting the activity the federal government appears to have an in-
terest in preventing. A state has an interest in protecting an activ-
ity if continuation of the activity will enhance the welfare of and
will achieve specific benefits for the citizens of the state. If the
state has such an interest, application of the Sherman Act to the
activities will frustrate the state policy. If the state policy is not
furthered by protection, however, a false conflict exists, and federal
law can be applied without conflict.152
1. The state has an interest in applying its policy concerning
compelled activity
When a state compels a specific activity, protection for the com-
pelled activity is very likely to further state policy. The state thus
has an interest in asserting its policy of compelling the activity. In
Parker v. Brown,153 for example, the state required raisin produc-
ers to adhere to the price and output agreements. The benefits
sought were to "conserve the agricultural wealth of the State" and
to "prevent economic waste in the marketing of agricultural prod-
ucts' 54 by reducing output and increasing prices. Applying the
Sherman Act to the agreements would have frustrated the state
policy. In Midcal, 55 the state required wholesale wine distributors
to adhere to established resale prices, demonstrating that Califor-
nia had an interest in protecting the resale price maintenance
scheme. The benefits sought from the regulation were not obvious;
apparently they were to "promote temperance and orderly market-
152. Similarly, when a state policy requires protection only of acts that the federal gov-
ernment has no interest in prohibiting, a false conflict exists, and the state policy of protec-
tion can continue without conflicting with federal policy.
153. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
154. Id. at 346.
155. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
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ing conditions." 156 Nevertheless, applying the Sherman Act's per se
illegality rule to the compelled acts would have frustrated Califor-
nia's policy.
2. A state may have an interest in applying its policy of protec-
tion for a noncompelled activity
The fact that a state compels an activity is good evidence that a
state has an interest in protecting the activity.157 Compulsion
should not be a prerequisite for a conclusion that a state policy will
be advanced by protecting an activity, however;158 despite its op-
tional nature, the noncompelled activity may nevertheless further
a state policy and cannot always be eliminated without conflict.
The question is not whether a state desires an activity so strongly
as to require it, but whether a state purpose or goal will suffer if
the Sherman Act is applied to the activity.
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States 59
involves a noncompelled activity that a state nevertheless had an
interest in protecting from Sherman Act vulnerability. Several
southern states permitted and in some cases actively encouraged'
truckers to engage in collective ratemaking, but the states did not
156. See Midcal Aluminum v. Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 984, 153 Cal. Rptr. 757, - (1979).
Obviously, those benefits can be achieved without resale price maintenance (RPM). Argua-
bly, the only real benefit sought from the statute was to give the industry the freedom to
undertake that which the Sherman Act prevents, resale price maintenance. Theoretically,
RPM can reduce inefficiencies created by the temptation of all resellers to take a free ride
on the pre-sale advertising and product-demonstration costs (wine tasting, for example) in-
curred by other resellers. See Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process,
supra note 68, at 1131-34. In addition, permitting RPM might eliminate the need for ineffi-
cient vertical integration into distribution that might otherwise occur by brand owners who,
for whatever reason, desire to avoid intrabrand price competition for their products.
157. See Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 62; P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 1 ANTITRUST
LAW T 215b, at 92-96 (1978) [hereinafter P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW]; P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1 212.6, at 62 (Supp. 1982) [hereinafter P. AREEDA &
D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW SUPPLEMENT] (arguing that compulsion is good evidence that a
state has a clearly articulated, affirmatively expressed policy concerning the activity that is
compelled).
158. See Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 62; P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST
LAW, supra note 157, 1 215b, at 92-96, (arguing that under some circumstances a clearly
articulated, affirmatively expressed state policy concerning an activity can be found even
though the state does not compel the acts.)
159. 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
160. Id. at 51.
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compel the price-fixing activity.161 The truckers were required to
submit the collectively determined rates to the state Public Service
Commissions for approval.
The states identified several benefits from their policies of per-
missive encouragement of collective ratemaking. The activity ena-
bled carriers to share the cost of preparing rate propos-
als-perhaps an efficient method for complying with state rate-
filing regulations.162 In addition, the jointly set and filed rates
could: reduce the state regulatory burden by reducing the number
of rates to approve; enable the state agency to consider more
closely each submitted rate proposal; and provide what some of the
states argued would be a desirable uniformity in prices.163
Consequently, in order to preserve these benefits, each of the
states had an interest in protecting the ability of the truckers to
engage in collective ratemaking, even though none of the states
compelled the activity.16 4 The state policies would be negated,
however, if the apparently conflicting Sherman Act policy prohibit-
161. The Supreme Court in effect concluded that the states had an interest in protecting
the activity, id. at 65, but the Court did so in the process of establishing that a policy short
of compulsion might still meet the clear articulation requirement. Id. at 61. The Court
found that a clearly articulated state policy of permissiveness concerning the collective
ratemaking activity would be frustrated by applying the Sherman Act to prohibit the activ-
ity, and held that the clear articulation requirement was satisfied despite the lack of com-
pulsion. Id. at 59-62. The Court criticized the Fifth Circuit assumption "that if anticompeti-
tive activity is not compelled, the State can have no interest in whether private parties
engage in that conduct. This type of analysis ignores the manner in which the States in this
case clearly have intended their permissive policies to work." Id. at 59.
162. Id. at 59.
163. Id. at 51 & n.5.
164. Stevens argued in dissent that because the state did not compel collectively set rates
and the truckers were free to prepare and submit their rate proposals individually, the col-
lective ratemaking could not have been essential to the state regulatory scheme. If none of
the truckers chose to act collectively, none of the benefits would be achieved. See id. at 76
(Stevens, J., dissenting). He may have been arguing that unless a particular activity is essen-
tial to a state's overall regulatory scheme, the benefits from the regulation can be achieved
without the activity, and therefore the state does not have an interest in protecting that
activity. Id. at 76 n.17. This concept of state interest is too narrow; nonessential activity
may be beneficial to the citizens of the state. Stevens' argument actually may have been
that the state had an interest in protecting collective ratemaking, but the policies of achiev-
ing regulatory benefits by allowing collective ratemaking conflict with both the Sherman Act
policy against price-fixing and the federal policy of deregulation of the motor carrier indus-
try. Id. at 77-78.
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ing the fixing of rates were applied to the collective ratemaking
activity.
3. State regulatory involvement with an activity does not by it-
self demonstrate that the state has an interest in protecting the
activity
A state's regulatory policy may include within its scope an activ-
ity that the federal government has an interest in preventing.
While the state always has an interest in protecting its regulatory
structure, if the state does not compel the activity, and there are
no particular benefits to the citizens of the state resulting from the
activity, the state may lack an interest in protecting the activity.
Such cases present false conflicts in favor of federal law.
a. False conflicts - Cantor, Goldfarb and Hoover
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,'65 for example, appears to present
a true conflict between state regulatory policy and Sherman Act
policy. The state, as part of a comprehensive regulatory policy con-
cerning the defendant utility, gave the defendant authorization to
provide both electricity and light bulbs to utility consumers with-
out a separate charge for the light bulbs. 6 6 The plaintiff claimed
the utility's joint sale of electricity and light bulbs for one price
was a tied sale; a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 67 The utility
defended on the grounds that the state approval shielded the com-
pany from Sherman Act liability.'
The extensive regulation of the utility by the state, however,
does not demonstrate that applying the Sherman Act to the util-
ity's activity would frustrate a state policy. The state's approval of
the light bulb giveaway, granted pursuant to the state's rate and
service approval program, 6 9 meant that the state did not object to
165. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
166. Id. at 581.
167. Id. at 581-82 & n.3.
168. Id. at 581.
169. The Michigan Public Service Commission (MPSC) extensively regulated electricity
distribution in the state. Id. at 584. The MPSC required the utility to obtain approval for
all rate and service offerings and to conform to the approved offerings, including the ap-
proved light bulb giveaway practice, until the utility submitted and received approval for a
new rate and service schedule. Id. at 582-83. The utility was free to submit proposed altera-
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the practice. But the state did not have a policy of encouraging,
promoting, or requiring tied sales. No producer of electricity was
required or encouraged to engage in the tie, there were no state
policies concerning light bulbs that would be furthered by allowing
the tied sale, 170 and disallowing the tie would not deprive the citi-
zens of Michigan of demonstrable benefits.17
The state had an interest in applying its rate and service regula-
tion policy. The purpose of the regulation was to ensure that the
utility, a regulated monopolist supplier of electricity, would pro-
vide effective service but not extract too high a price from its con-
sumers. The service and rate approval regulations thus were cru-
cial to the regulatory policy of the state, but that policy is not
furthered by allowing electricity producers to tie light bulbs to
electricity. The state policy toward the tie was one of neutrality.12
tions abandoning the practice, however, and, in 1964, the utility had received approval to
eliminate the light bulb giveaway with respect to "large commercial customers." Id. at 583.
170. Id. at 584.
171. Id. at 584-85, 598. The MPSC did find the program to be in the public interest, id. at
630 (Stewart, J., dissenting), suggesting a possible state protective interest. Nothing in the
case suggested that the state had affirmatively concluded that specific benefits to the citi-
zens of Michigan arose from the tie, however. The purpose of the tied sale, according to the
utility, was to increase the consumption of electricity. Id. at 584. The utility also argued that
the program saved consumers three million dollars a year. Id. at 584 n.9. If demonstrated,
this fact might have signalled a state interest in protecting the tie because it generated
efficiencies in the distribution of light bulbs. In that event, rather than a false conflict, the
conflict is an apparent true conflict between a state policy of protecting a tie and a federal
policy prohibiting such ties.
Light bulb distribution efficiencies were not expressed as part of any state policy, how-
ever, and were not demonstrated. The savings argument was probably spurious, because the
utility's costs incurred from buying and distributing the light bulbs appear to have been
included in the utility's ratebase, and the partial elimination of the giveaway apparently had
resulted in a general rate reduction for the customers no longer receiving the bulbs. Id. at
583. These facts suggest that consumers were paying the utility a profitable rate-of-return
on the costs of providing the light bulbs as part of their electric bill. Because the utility did
not bill in a pro rata fashion for the light bulbs, the probable effect was to subsidize those
who used a lot of light bulbs at the expense of those who used a smaller amount, without
reducing the overall cost to consumers of electricity and light bulb consumption. Id. The
utility did not argue that it could purchase and distribite light bulbs more efficiently than
could any other distributor, although bulk buying and distribution efficiencies were conceiv-
ably present. A tie is not necessary to achieve such efficiencies, however, suggesting that the
state did not need to protect the tie to protect the ability of the utility to efficiently dis-
tribute light bulbs to those who would benefit from the distribution.
172. Id. at 585.
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Consequently, Cantor represents a false conflict. The federal
policy of prohibiting tied sales did not conflict with the state's in-
terest in maintaining its regulatory program, because the state did
not have a policy that would be furthered by protecting the tied
sale of light bulbs and electricity. 73 The state had an interest in
applying its policy of disapproving any aspect of the utility's rate
and service offerings that the state found not to be in the public
interest. It had no interest, however, in protecting the utility's acts
from a federal law that might find the activity objectionable even
though the state did not.'7 4
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,7 5 a different kind of state
regulatory program appeared to but in fact did not conflict with
Sherman Act policy. Regulation of the conduct of lawyers by the
State of Virginia included ethical standards established and en-
forced by the state supreme court. 76 The Fairfax County Bar As-
sociation established a fee schedule that lawyers were expected to
follow, and facilitated adherence with the threat that failure to
comply could subject an attorney to sanctions for violation of the
state supreme court-imposed ethical standards. A consumer of le-
gal services sued the county and state bar associations, claiming
that the fee schedule was price-fixing, a per se violation of the
Sherman Act.17 7 The Sherman Act policy prohibiting price-fixing
thus appeared to conflict with a state policy of telling lawyers that
failure to adhere to the price schedules constituted unethical
behavior.
The state, however, did not require conformance to fee sched-
ules; the legislature had "explicitly directed lawyers not 'to be con-
173. See id. at 598 (opinion of Stevens, J.). In effect, the Court decided that there was no
conflict between a state policy and the Sherman Act, and denied the claim of immunity.
174. Stewart argued in dissent that the fear of concurrent antitrust liability may chill a
state's ability to regulate effectively. Id. at 627-28 (Stewart, J., dissenting). If his argument
is correct, then the state's regulation in and of itself may indicate a state interest in protect-
ing all activity by all regulated firms from federal antitrust enforcement. Stewart's argument
is not particularly persuasive, however, both for Cantor and in general. State regulation that
approves an activity but does not confer immunity from the Sherman Act can still be effec-
tive. In fact, the state may be interested in having the Sherman Act apply; it can then
reduce its regulatory assessment, leaving the antitrust laws to police certain aspects of the
firm's conduct.
175. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
176. Id. at 775-77.
177. Id. at 775-78.
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trolled' by fee schedules."' " The fact that the state had "a compel-
ling interest in the practice of professions within their
boundaries,' 7119 and thus had an interest in applying its policy of
regulating some of the activities of the bar, did not mean that a
state policy would be furthered by protecting agreements between
competing lawyers both to conform to fee schedules and to subject
nonconforming lawyers to disciplinary action. As a result, Virginia
had no interest in protecting the activity, and the apparent conflict
was actually a false conflict. 0
Hoover v. Ronwin'8 ' also involves a conflict rendered false by the
lack of a state interest. Hoover, an applicant denied admission to
the Arizona bar, sued the individual members of the bar's Exami-
nation and Admissions Committee, claiming they had conspired to
place an artificial limit on the number of lawyers in the state in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 82 The committee argued
that its actions were protected by state action immunity, thus rais-
ing the spectre of conflict. 1
Arizona has a policy of requiring a bar examination; the purpose
is to identify people who are not minimally competent to practice
law and prevent them from practicing in the state. The plaintiff,
however, did not claim that Arizona's competence policy was illegal
or that the state had a policy of allowing lawyers to make anticom-
petitive agreements that were not designed to identify minimal
competence. He simply alleged an illegal agreement among lawyers
to exclude competent potential competitors from the market. Con-
sequently, unless Arizona had an interest in protecting the agree-
ments that Hoover alleged to have taken place, the conflict is false.
Arizona has no interest in protecting agreements among lawyers
to exclude competent applicants from practicing law in Arizona.
The state did not indicate that its policy allowed the activity and
178. Id. at 789.
179. Id. at 792.
180. The Supreme Court concluded that the fee schedules were not part of state activity,
and thus state action immunity was not granted. Id. at 789-90.
181. 466 U.S. 558 (1984).
182. Id. at 565.
183. See id. at 566. The Supreme Court agreed and barred the suit, id. at 582, a result
contrary to my contention that the case is a false conflict and that federal law should have
been applied.
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the citizens of the state would not obviously benefit from such
agreements. The state policy of ensuring minimal competence is
not frustrated by the application of section 1 of the Sherman Act
to agreements among lawyers to hamper competent entry. The fact
that the Arizona Supreme Court, rather than the Committee, made
the ultimate decision concerning Hoover's admission's" strongly
suggests that Hoover's claim ultimately would have failed, because
the Committee did not have the ultimate power to effectuate his
asserted result. A substantial likelihood that the plaintiff would
not prevail on the merits, however, does not demonstrate that Ari-
zona had any interest in allowing the activity that allegedly vio-
lated the Sherman Act, let alone a state interest sufficient to bar
the suit altogether."85
There is no need to reach for conflicts that do not exist. Con-
trary to the result the majority reached in Hoover, state and fed-
eral policies could exist side-by-side. Federal law should have been
applied.
b. Patrick - false conflict?
Patrick v. Burget' s is a tougher call. In Patrick, a doctor
claimed that a peer-review process contemplating termination of
his hospital privileges was motivated by competing doctors' desire
to eliminate him as a competitor, and thus violated sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act.18 At trial, the jury found for the plaintiff,
confirming that the federal government had a Sherman Act inter-
est in prohibiting the activity.'88 The state, however, had a policy
of requiring peer-review activities; hospitals in Oregon were "under
184. Id. at 561 & n.2.
185. The majority concluded that all acts of the Committee were state acts, and thus the
acts alleged by the plaintiff were protected by state action. Id. at 572-574. The suit was
dismissed. The majority did not find, however, that Arizona actually had a policy of allowing
lawyers to make the agreements claimed by the plaintiff. Id. at 574. Justice Stevens argued
in dissent that the activities were not state action and were not eligible for immunity. Id. at
593-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a discussion of why Hoover might have been dismissed
properly on summary judgment even if state action immunity were not availAble, see
Lopatka, supra note 5, at 1014-16.
186. 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988).
187. Id. at 1660-61.
188. Id. at 1661.
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a statutory obligation to establish peer- review procedures."' 89
Consequently, the defendants, also doctors, claimed that Oregon's
policy requiring peer review transformed their activity into state
action that was exempt from antitrust liability, thus raising a con-
flict between state and federal policies. 190
Did Oregon have an interest in protecting the defendants' activ-
ity from the Sherman Act? The mandatory peer-review policy cer-
tainly did not compel or condone anticompetitive activity that con-
flicted with Sherman Act policy, and peer review can be effectively
implemented without violating the Sherman Act. The defendants'
efforts to terminate the plaintiff's hospital privileges seem to fall
outside the scope of the state's protective policy because they were
anticompetitively motivated rather than legitimate peer-review ac-
tivity. The state was interested in protecting its policy of
mandatory peer review, but the interest may have extended only to
protecting those peer-review activities that did not run afoul of the
Sherman Act.
On the other hand, as the defendants argued, "any threat of an-
titrust liability will prevent physicians from participating openly
and actively in peer-review proceedings."'' Congress ultimately
recognized this problem and took steps to correct it. 192 Conse-
quently, it is hard to dismiss the argument that protecting virtu-
ally all peer-review related activities from the Sherman Act would
significantly further Oregon's policy of mandatory peer review.
Without the protection, no peer-review program would be fully ef-
fective, and benefits from Oregon's policy of mandatory meaning-
ful peer review would be undermined.'93 A policy of protecting all
189. Id. at 1663.
190. Id. at 1662. The Supreme Court withheld immunity, finding that the Midcal active
supervision requirement was not met. Id. at 1662-63.
191. Id. at 1665.
192. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (Supp. IV 1986). Congress specifically found that anti-
trust liability "unreasonably discourages physicians from participating in effective profes-
sional peer review," and removed all damages liability for peer review acts and reporting of
information, as long as the acts were done in a reasonable belief that the actions were in
furtherance of quality health care. Id. §§ 11101, 11111(a)(1)-(2), 11112. See Patrick, 108 S.
Ct. at 1665 n.8.
193. This analysis may seem to reach to find a conflict in a manner contrary to Currie's
admonition to use restraint and moderation in interpreting state policies and interests.
(Reaching for conflict is also inconsistent with my criticism of the result in Hoover. See text
accompanying notes 183-86). Possible state interests should not be ignored at the initial
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peer-review related activities, however, apparently conflicts with
the Sherman Act policy of preventing anticompetitive activity
among competitors regardless of whether it is connected to peer-
review.
C. Resolving Apparent Conflicts: Moderate and Restrained Reas-
sessments of Federal and State Policy
In many state action cases, an initial assessment suggests both a
federal interest in preventing an activity and a state interest in
protecting the activity from Sherman Act liability. In such cases,
an apparent, or a prima facie'" conflict between federal and state
policy exists, and the Currie interest analysis calls for reconsidera-
tion of the relevant policies and interests to determine whether a
more moderate and restrained interpretation would avoid the con-
flict. Such a reconsideration, especially concerning federal policy,
may indicate that some prima facie conflicts are in fact false
conflicts.
assessment stage, however; a restrained and moderate initial assessment of the state interest
may simply result in assuming that the state policy did not conflict with the federal policy.
An initial finding that Oregon has no interest might interfere needlessly with Oregon's peer-
review system if upon reassessment federal interest is lacking. See supra note 124. Unless,
upon reassessment, a federal interest is not present, the Oregon policy will not protect the
defendants regardless of whether the case is viewed as a false conflict, due to the absence of
state interest, or a true conflict. Either way, federal law will be applied.
What makes Patrick arguably different from Cantor, Goldfarb and Hoover is that the fear
of treble damage antitrust liability may seriously undermine the state policy of evaluations
by private party peers. In Goldfarb and Cantor, fear of liability did not frustrate any state
regulatory policy. In Hoover, application of the Sherman Act would not hamper the state's
efforts to establish standards for and test for minimum competence for lawyers. If the com-
mittee was subject to antitrust liability, perhaps attorneys would be fearful of serving on the
committee; but the uniform minimum standard for competence, dictated by the state, is far
different from the case-by-case nature of peer review. The state, which made the ultimate
decisions regarding competence and how to test for it, Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 561
(1984), could hire its own employees instead of using a committee of lawyers, and could
implement the identical procedures without any fear. By contrast, Patrick involved a state
policy that required private parties to evaluate each other. Peer review could perhaps be
accomplished with reviews by noncompeting doctors (thus reducing antitrust concerns), or
by hiring doctors whose sole function would be peer review, but neither of these alternatives
would implement an actual "peer" review.
194. A prima facie conflict is established by evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the state and federal government have an interest in applying their policies to the disputed
activity. It does not mean anything different from what Currie adherents describe to be
apparent conflicts or apparent true conflicts. See supra note 122.
1989] INTEREST ANALYSIS APPLIED TO ANTITRUST CONFLICTS 751
The reassessment does not involve ignoring the federal interest,
or assuming that the federal policy is one of deference to a conflict-
ing state policy, as Parker and its progeny appear to have done.
Sherman Act policies, properly defined, however, do not prohibit
all inefficient or anticompetitive activity. Consequently, a moder-
ate and restrained view of the federal policy narrows the area of
federal-state conflict. In addition, a state policy that provides for
supervision of the conflicting activity in a manner that accommo-
dates the antitrust concerns with the activity may not be in actual
conflict with the Sherman Act. The federal antitrust interest in
prohibiting certain activities may also be narrower in some cases
than Sherman Act policy alone would suggest, because other fed-
eral policies that supplement Sherman Act policies must be
considered.
1. The scope of Sherman Act policy
A comprehensive, "manifest destiny" interpretation of Sherman
Act policy could suggest that virtually all state regulation conflicts
with the Sherman Act. If Sherman Act policy really "establish[es]
a regime of competition as the fundamental principle governing
commerce in this country,"19 5 virtually all state regulation is incon-
sistent, because by definition state regulation tampers with the
market process. 9" Similarly, enrollees of the efficiency-only school
may argue that if the sole purpose of the Sherman Act is to pro-
mote efficiency, state regulations conflict with the Act and should
be preempted unless they enhance efficiency. 9 7
195. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398 (1978) (citing
Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 229-35 (1948)); see
also United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) ("Antitrust laws in general,
and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise .... [The free-
dom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete
.... "); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 61 (1985)
("[T]he goal of the antitrust laws [is] unfettered competition in the marketplace.").
196. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 71, at 24-25; Hovenkamp & Mackerron, supra note
64, at 721; Wiley, supra note 6, at 745. This sort of analysis leads to the argument that
without the federalism interpretation of the Sherman Act and state action immunity virtu-
ally all state regulation would be preempted. See, e.g., Jorde, supra note 71, at 227-28.
197. See Cirace, supra note 6, at 486 (proposing efficiency as part of a preemption test);
Garland, supra note 96, at 508-12 (criticizing the approach); Spitzer, supra note 65, at 1318-
21 (discussing, rather than advocating, such an approach).
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These global policy statements exaggerate the true extent of fed-
eral antitrust policy. If implemented, they would apply a maxi-
mum Sherman Act policy to state regulations, a policy stronger
than the policy currently applied to nonregulated activity. Adopt-
ing such strong, expansionary views of Sherman Act policies when
reassessing whether federal policies and interests are in true con-
flict with state policies and interests, however, would result in pre-
empting state laws that do not irreconcilably conflict with the
Sherman Act. For that reason, the broad policy pronouncements
are particularly misleading in the state action area. A moderate
and restrained view of Sherman Act policy is far less extreme than
either of these views and can coexist with many forms of state
regulation.
a. The Sherman Act does not prohibit all anticompetitive
or inefficient activity
A restrained and moderate evaluation of the scope of Sherman
Act policy must not ignore the methods chosen to implement the
Act's purposes. Although the antitrust laws implicitly assume that
unconstrained firms will try to increase their wealth in ways that
are harmful to society, the Sherman Act proscription of methods
that firms might employ is actually quite restrained. The Act itself
represents an accommodation; it does not proscribe all anticompe-
titive or inefficient activity. In addition, the Act is behaviorally ori-
ented; it is directed toward elimination of activities rather than to-
ward results.
The result of. attempting to prohibit all inefficient or anticompe-
titive activity probably would be to deter considerable beneficial
activity, and in any event the Sherman Act does not attempt to do
so. Instead, the efficiency and distributive goals of the Sherman
Act are promoted by prohibiting a more limited number of activi-
ties. The Act facilitates but does not mandate competition or a
competitive market. Firms may refuse to compete with competitors
as long as they do not agree to do so; they are free, for example, to
broadly announce their pricing policies, publicly decry price com-
petition, and identically imitate the behavior of other firms in their
industry. Similarly, firms are not forbidden from engaging in ineffi-
cient activity, squandering resources, or pricing in a welfare-harm-
ful monopolistic manner. Section 1 only prohibits agreements in
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restraint of trade, not all inefficient acts, all anticompetitive acts,
or all restraints of trade. Similarly, section 2 does not prohibit all
monopoly power or all inefficient monopoly behavior. Firms are
discouraged from obtaining market power, but possession is not a
crime. Monopoly (or above-cost) pricing, which usually results in
both welfare losses and distribution away from purchasers if done
by one or several firms, is not prohibited by either section 1 or
section 2 of the Sherman Act.
The pro-consumer distributional purpose of the Act is also lim-
ited in scope. Many activities that enable firms to extract surplus
from consumers or that result in a distribution significantly at va-
riance with what a competitive market would yield are not prohib-
ited. The underlying policy is to prevent some, but not all, firm
activity that facilitates the extraction of surplus from consumers.198
b. The Sherman Act does not contain a laissez-faire or a
deregulation policy
Although the antitrust laws generally reflect a pro-competition
policy, they are not designed to implement and do not implement
a noninterventionist, deregulatory policy that would prohibit all
state regulations not given special immunity.199 The Sherman Act
obviously is itself a regulation, and thus imposes an intervention-
ist, nonlaissez-faire policy on the market. The Act is a well-recog-
nized paradox; it seeks to facilitate a more competitive environ-
ment by market interference that tampers with an open and
unrestricted market.
198. The Sherman Act also promotes the small firm autonomy value in a less than sweep-
ing manner. Many activities that inevitably place smaller, independent businesses at a dis-
advantage are perfectly legal. For example, a firm that expands internally or integrates to
achieve the lower costs that result from economies of scale, management, mass reserves and
the like will hurt the smaller independents, but the Act does not invariably make such activ-
ity illegal.
199. Some portions of the legislative history of the Sherman Act suggest that state regula-
tion of firms' activities was anticipated. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 632-
35 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Far from demonstrating an intent to pre-empt state
laws aimed at preventing or controlling combinations or monopolies, the legislative debates
show that Congress' goal was to supplement such state efforts .... Id. at 633.). Although
the legislative history does not reveal a congressional desire to leave state regulation free
from preemption, see Werden & Balmer, supra note 6, at 46-56, it does suggest that Con-
gress did not believe that a state's tampering with the market was inevitably contrary to
Sherman Act purposes. See also Garland, supra note 96, at 511.
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In addition, the history of the Sherman Act does not suggest
that it condemns state or local government regulation simply be-
cause that regulation tampers with the market. The problems that
prompted the enactment of the Sherman Act were not related to
inefficient or anticompetitive state regulations of the market.200
During the period when expansions of congressional power ex-
panded the reach of the Sherman Act, thereby creating the state
action problem,201 federal as well as state economic regulation pro-
liferated, 2  an indication of a lack of federal hostility towards gov-
ernmental regulatory tampering with markets. 0 3 As the Court rec-
ognized in Parker, the language of the Act is not geared toward
elimination of large quantities of state regulation.204
The Act thus does not reflect a federal mandate for a nonregu-
lated economic environment. Its more limited focus-prevention of
industry domination through competitor agreements or the actions
of a single firm-is on prohibition of industry self-regulation 20 5
rather than on total deregulation. The Supreme Court has held
that Sherman Act policies are not broad enough to preempt state
200. In fact, one of the reasons for enactment was the belief that states alone could not
effectively control the powerful trusts existing at the time. See Easterbrook, supra note 71,
at 41.
201. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing); Easterbrook, supra note 71, at 40-41; Hovenkamp & Mackerron, supra note 64, at 725-
28; Spitzer, supra note 65, at 1295; Werden & Balmer, supra note 6, at 56-58.
202. See Kennedy, supra note 72, at 33 n.16; Wiley, supra note 6, at 718-19.
203. But see generally Wiley, supra note 6. Professor Wiley suggests that relatively re-
cent federal limitations on regulation and Supreme Court decisions limiting state action
immunity reflect an increasing societal hostility towards governmental regulation. Id. at 715-
28.
204. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943).
205. See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (refusing to allow
dentists to counteract possible inadequate treatment choices by patients by agreeing not to
submit patient X-rays to insurance companies); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (refusing to allow the Society to agree not to compete on
price as a method of ensuring safe construction); United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S.
596, 610 (1972) ("certain private citizens or groups" are not allowed to foreclose the ability
of others the freedom to compete); Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S.
457 (1941) (disallowing industry agreements designed to correct possible unfair trade prac-
tices and tortious activities and indicating correction must be left to state law); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (indicating that activity formerly
regulated by government is per se illegal when no longer regulated; an industry is not al-
lowed to make anticompetitive agreements to self-regulate to correct a market failure, re-
gardless of the efficiency of the activity).
754
1989] INTEREST ANALYSIS APPLIED TO ANTITRUST CONFLICTS 755
regulations simply because they may impose an anticompetitive re-
sult.206 Rather than conflicting in every case with the Sherman Act,
state-imposed economic regulation can be a nonconflicting method
of dealing with market imperfections that is vastly preferable to
industry self-regulation through agreement.20 7
2. A moderate and restrained Sherman Act policy
Because the Sherman Act neither contains antigovernmental
regulation values nor precludes all inefficient or anticompetitive
activity, a state regulation might inefficiently interfere with market
rivalry but not be in conflict with Sherman Act policy. Regulations
should be considered along with all other activity that possibly
falls within the Sherman Act policy proscriptions. Regulatory in-
terference with market rivalry conflicts with Sherman Act policy
when it is accomplished by requiring, encouraging, or allowing
firms to make agreements that will enhance their collective power;
by enforcing such agreements; or by enabling or allowing a single
firm or group of firms to obtain or maintain unconstrained power
over price and output.20
Conversely, regulations that do not impose or enforce agree-
ments in restraint of trade and do not confer unconstrained mar-
ket power do not conflict with the Sherman Act, even if they are
inefficient or restrain market rivalry.209 Such regulations are possi-
206. See, e.g., Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982); Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 133 (1978).
207. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (indicating
that maximum medical prices set by a state agency are preferable to a system that allows
the competitors to set prices themselves).
208. See Garland, supra note 96, at 506 (regulations that "delegate to private parties the
power to restrain competition" conflict with the Sherman Act, because the restraints are
"the particular evil Congress intended the Sherman Act to prevent."). See also Conant,
supra note 6, at 267; Werden & Balmer, supra note 6, at 63. (Neither of the latter two
articles, however, proposes to limit the area of conflict to the extent suggested by the moder-
ate and restrained interpretation discussed in this section.)
209. For example, a state might pass a regulation that requires the price for a product to
be set at a specific level. The legislation removes all price competition, but it does not re-
quire or encourage any firm to violate the antitrust laws, because the legislation requires no
agreement, does not entitle producers to dictate resale prices to resellers, and does not give
any firm unconstrained monopoly power. The effect of the regulation is indistinguishable
from the effect of an adhered-to horizontal agreement among competitors to charge that
price, but all activities that yield a result identical to the result of a horizontal agreement
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bly inefficient but not illegal activity, analogous to inefficient pri-
vate firm activity that falls beyond the scope of the Act because it
does not amount to an agreement in restraint of trade or
monopolization.21 0
This restrained interpretation protects federalism values without
adopting them as part of Sherman Act policy. A state is allowed to
regulate in any manner it chooses-including eliminating competi-
tion entirely-as long as it does not permit firms to collectively
determine prices, output, quality and other forms of competition
and does not provide firms with market power and the unre-
strained ability to exercise it. Health, safety and competence regu-
lations established by the state, rather than by any industry agree-
ment, for example, will not be in conflict with the Sherman Act.21" '
a. The problem of capture
This restrained and moderate interpretation will not satisfy
those interested in eliminating what they perceive to be inefficient,
undesirable state regulations that tamper with the market and
seem to have been enacted solely to benefit producers. The inter-
are not contrary to Sherman Act values. The theoretical perfectly competitive market in
equilibrium, for example, to some the nirvana of antitrust enforcement, would perform in a
manner indistinguishable from a horizontal agreement on price by all market participants.
In fact, any set of prices charged by firms in a market yields a result indistinguishable from
adherence to a horizontal agreement among the participants in the industry that they will
charge those prices. Under a restrained and moderate view, the state price regulation, which
may or may not be inefficient, would not clearly conflict with federal policy, because Sher-
man Act policy is not to prevent all activities that might yield a result similar to the result
an agreement might yield. In contrast, a statute that permits or requires firms in an indus-
try to agree on a price to charge or to set resale prices, or that enforces those arrangements,
probably would be in conflict with section 1 of the Sherman Act. But see Slater, supra note
18, at 78 ("The state action facilitates an anticompetitive effect which could not otherwise
have taken place in the private sector without an actual conspiracy. Although the technical
elements of a Sherman Act violation may not be present, the Sherman Act policy in favor of
competition is certainly breached.").
210. The policy identified in this section is not so far from the policy the Supreme Court
announced in Fisher. See supra text accompanying notes 51-55. It is also not so far from the
language, if not the result and current interpretation, of Parker; a state does not violate the
Sherman Act just by regulating, but a state may not authorize Sherman Act violations.
211. It is conceivable that in a rare case a state may enact a licensing regulation that gives
a firm or a group of firms an unrestrained power to control price and output. In that case,
the regulation may allow monopolization acts in conflict with Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
See Conant, supra note 6, at 266; Werden & Balmer, supra note 6, at 64-68.
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pretation only deprives the states of regulatory methods that bla-
tantly conflict with the Sherman Act and leaves states with consid-
erable latitude to directly regulate firm behavior. The federalism
camp may be somewhat mollified by the result, but it may place a
large furrow in efficiency and deregulation brows.
Because states will be free to regulate firm behavior, firms will
continue to be tempted to manipulate that regulatory power for
their own benefit. As Professor John Wiley has emphasized re-
cently, economic theory and history indicate that private industry
may be able to successfully induce state and local (as well as fed-
eral) governments to adopt regulations that provide producers with
monopoly profits unavailable in a competitive market.212 Aban-
doning state action immunity and antitrust federalism in favor of
an interest analysis and preemption of truly conflicting state laws
can eliminate "captured" regulations that enable firms to make
agreements or that give a firm unconstrained market power, but it
will not prevent other capture-oriented results. Inefficient direct
price and output regulation or regulatory structures conducive to
long-run manipulation and susceptible to rubber stamp approval
of industry "suggestions" may persist.21
3
Consequently, the restrained and moderate interpretation of
Sherman Act policy will not adequately combat what Wiley argues
is "the real problem with state and local regulation-capture." 21"4
To correct the capture problem, Wiley has proposed that the Sher-
man Act should be interpreted to contain an anticapture value,
and that the value should be implemented by preempting all state
regulations that interfere with market rivalry (virtually all regula-
tions), are enacted due to the "decisive efforts of producers," and
are not demonstrated to respond to a "substantial market
inefficiency. '215
212. Wiley, supra note 6.
213. Agreed-upon efforts by the industry and dominant single firm activities that induce
the government to adopt such potentially harmful regulations are not violations of the Sher-
man Act. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961). Firms are thus free to propose and to aggressively promote these regulatory propos-
als, although consumers are just as free to oppose them or to propose their own regulations.
214. Wiley, supra note 6, at 733. See also Wiley, supra note 96.
215. Wiley, supra note 6, at 743.
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The proposal, which has been characterized as "radical, '"16 and
its harms and merits, have been discussed thoroughly in the litera-
ture.21 7 Capture may in fact be a real problem, and Wiley's pro-
posed policy may be effective and advisable for dealing with it, but
despite the disillusionment with regulation in some circles, federal
anticapture policy is not obviously embedded in federal antitrust
laws. The Sherman Act is designed to deal with behavior such as
agreements and monopolization, rather than with regulations that
do not correct for market failure and have the effect of benefitting
producers. The firm behavior that Wiley finds objectionable-the
activity of capturing legislators and regulators-does not violate
the Act.218 Federal deregulation has not been accomplished by the
judiciary or through judicial conclusions that federal atitrust laws
or other regulations called for deregulation. To the extent deregu-
lation has taken place, it has been implemented on an industry-by-
industry basis, at a painstaking pace, through the political pro-
cess. 19 The federal deregulation movement did not create within
the Sherman Act a federal policy calling for immediate and com-
plete deregulation of all industries in which the producers sup-
ported regulations that cannot be justified as correcting a substan-
tial market failure.
Consequently, although more moderate and restrained than in-
terpretations that would find the Sherman Act in true conflict with
all state regulation or all inefficient state regulation, the proposed
anticapture interpretation still expands Sherman Act policy far be-
yond a minimum or necessary scope. The interpretation is pre-
216. Page, supra note 5, at 619. Wiley referred to aspects of his proposal as approaching
"antitrust imperialism." Wiley, supra note 6, at 767. See also Gifford, supra note 68, at 1303
(terming the proposal "extreme").
217. See, e.g., Garland, Antitrust and Federalism: A Response to Professor Wiley, 96
YALE L.J. 1291, 1293 (1987); Garland, supra note 96; Gifford, supra note 68; Page, Capture,
Clear Articulation, and Legitimacy: A Reply to Professor Wiley, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1343
(1988); Page, supra note 5; Spitzer, supra note 65; Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust
Federalism: Reply to Professors Page and Spitzer, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter Wiley, Capture]; Wiley, The Berkeley Rent Control Case: Treating Victims as Villains,
1986 Sup. CT. REV. 157 [hereinafter Wiley, Berkeley]; Wiley, supra note 6; Wiley, supra note
96.
218. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961).
219. See M. DERTHIcK & P. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION (1985); S. BREYER,
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 317-40 (1982).
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mised on the idea that extensive state and local economic regula-
tion is not legitimate and should be preempted; the burden is
placed on the state to justify, whenever producers decisively sup-
ported the regulations, that the regulations are correcting for mar-
ket failure.220 The Sherman Act does not subject private firm be-
havior that does not involve agreements or monopolization to such
a burden. Yet a regulation that similarly does not solicit, compel,
or condone agreements or monopolization would be subjected to
that burden if it were enacted due to legal efforts by producers.221
Adoption of such a strong view of Sherman Act policy would im-
pair state autonomy values significantly.222
The bias in an interest analysis, however, should be toward
avoiding nullification of state policies unless conflict is unavoidable
and irreconcilable. Currie's plan for conflict avoidance counsels
specifically against pushing the interpretation of an apparently
conflicting policy to its constitutional or ultimate possible limit.2 23
By asserting that a strong deregulatory agenda for inefficient regu-
lation is part of federal Sherman Act policy, the anticapture inter-
pretation seeks rather than avoids conflict. Until Congress more
clearly articulates a deregulation agenda aimed at inefficient, cap-
tured state and local regulations,2 4 such a policy should not be
220. Wiley, supra note 6, at 763.
221. Id. at 764.
222. See Garland, supra note 96, at 516 n.181; Wiley, supra note 6, at 740-41; see also
Page, supra note 5.
223. See Currie, supra note 17, at 757:
[I]t may be clear that if the forum were to assert an interest in the application
of its policy, it would be constitutionally justified in doing so. But no principle
dictates that a state exploit every possible conflict, or exert to the outermost
limits its constitutional power. On the contrary, to assert a conflict between the
interests of the forum and the foreign state is a serious matter; the mere fact
that a suggested broad conception of a local interest will create conflict with
that of a foreign state is a sound reason why the conception should be re-
examined, with a view to a more moderate and restrained interpretation both
of the policy and of the circumstances in which it must be applied to effectuate
the forum's legitimate purpose.
Id. at 757 (emphasis in original).
224. See Garland, supra note 217, at 1293. The issue is not whether Congress could or
should adopt such a policy; Congress has the power, and the adoption of such a policy would
be consistent with antitrust values. Such an interpretation, however, is not moderate and
restrained or an inevitable conclusion concerning federal policy and is not necessary to re-
solve the currently existing conflicts. See also Gifford, supra note 68, who argues that the
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assumed to be part of Sherman Act policy, and should not be used
to preempt state regulation. For purposes of identifying conflicts
between state and federal policies, the federal interest should be
only coextensive with the activities the Sherman Act prohibits.
This more moderate and restrained interpretation itself may fur-
ther some anticapture values.225
current state action approach is unworkable, id. at 1286-87, and that federal policy concern-
ing state regulation should be clarified by congressional action, id. at 1294. Gifford proposes
federal legislation that would allow state and local regulations to depart from Sherman Act
policies only if the public has adequate information concerning the pluses and minuses of
such regulation, and only so long as the anticompetitive effects of any such regulation do not
cross state lines. Id. at 1294-99. Gifford's proposed law, a federally articulated policy con-
taining Wiley's capture test, or any additional federal legislation would of course facilitate
the determination of the federal interest. This Article deals with the conflict between state
regulations and federal policy as it currently exists.
225. Wiley seems to present a choice between adopting the anticapture proposal or re-
turning to the thrilling days of yesteryear, i.e. an approach to state regulation that is totally
deferential to state autonomy values. Wiley, supra note 6, at 740-41. The choice is not nec-
essary. Abandoning the "principles of federalism" approach, and substituting an interest
analysis that preempts state regulations that permit anticompetitive agreements or confer
unconstrained power, accommodates a restrained and moderate Sherman Act policy, and to
some extent accommodates the anticapture value. If firms convince a state to adopt "cap-
tured" regulations that permit anticompetitive agreements or confer unconstrained power,
the regulations will be preempted. Although Wiley argues that the inevitable result of that
preemption will only be more direct harmful regulation, producers may have more difficulty
marshalling the power needed to convince a state to adopt more direct and comprehensive
regulations that benefit the producers. See Easterbrook, supra note 71, at 33. Producers
that were able to agree to seek regulation enabling them to make agreements may splinter
into less powerful pieces when trying to reach a consensus on what the direct regulation
should entail. The result may be that no consensus will emerge. As well, the all-encompass-
ing nature of more direct forms of regulation may make it far more expensive to implement
and, therefore, unattractive to legislatures. Further, as Spitzer points out, see supra note 65,
at 1303-09, many different groups with different interests can attempt to influence the regu-
latory process. Consumers, who may exercise their own power, can be expected to oppose
any regulation that is contrary to their interests.
Nevertheless, rather than frustrating capture, the limited accommodation may simply re-
sult in more direct state regulation that is less efficient because it is less flexible. Cartels fall
apart more rapidly than direct regulation. It is hard to predict whether the net result of the
limited frustration will be beneficial or harmful. See Easterbrook, supra note 71, at 32. Such
a result is not inconsistent with the Sherman Act. The Act, rather than imposing an iron-
clad rule concerning competition and efficiency, takes a more ambivalent approach: firms
are not allowed to agree even if that would be the most efficient solution to a problem, but
they are not forbidden from parallel behavior effectuating a result indistinguishable from a
highly anticompetitive agreement; firms are strongly discouraged from obtaining market
power because exercising power is harmful, but they are allowed to exploit any legally ob-
tained power at the expense of consumers and society; firms are prohibited per se from
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b. False conflicts - Fisher and Rice
A moderate and restrained reassessment of federal policy ren-
ders many prima facie conflicts false, because the reassessment in-
dicates no true federal interest in preventing the regulatory activ-
ity. Fisher v. City of Berkeley226 illustrates such a false conflict.
In Fisher, landlords asserted that a Berkeley, California rent-
control ordinance was in conflict with sections 1 and 2 of the Sher-
man Act. By placing a ceiling on rents, the ordinances eliminated
some aspects of a competitive rental housing market. If all land-
lords in the city agreed to impose such a price ceiling, for example,
their agreement probably would be a per se violation of the Sher-
man Act.221 7 The case thus involved an apparent conflict; the city
had an interest in protecting its regulation and the federal govern-
ment had an interest in protecting competition by prohibiting the
regulation.
The United States Supreme Court, however, affirmed a Califor-
nia Supreme Court decision that the ordinance did not conflict
with the Sherman Act.22s The ordinance did not require acts that
violated the Sherman Act, because it did not require or permit
landlords to agree with each other concerning rental rates or out-
put, and no actual agreement existed between each landlord and
the city. Nor did the ordinance compel or sanction agreements
among consumers of rental housing, or provide anyone with uncon-
strained market power.229 Consequently, although the ordinance
resale price maintenance, but are not prohibited from inefficiently vertically integrating and
selling their own product at whatever price they choose.
226. 475 U.S. 260, 263 (1986).
227. Price-fixing of maximum rates is generally per se illegal. See, e.g., Arizona v. Mari-
copa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145
(1968).
228. Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 693 P.2d 261, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1984),
afl'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 260 (1986). The California Supreme Court used a test de-
rived from the commerce clause to determine that no conflict existed between the Berkeley
ordinance and the Sherman Act. 475 U.S. at 264.
229. The Supreme Court skipped over the possibility that the ordinance itself was an
agreement among lessees of rental property to not pay more than a certain amount for each
rental unit. See Wiley, Berkeley, supra note 217. Collusively acquired monopsony power
(i.e., purchasing power, rather than selling power) is potentially just as harmful as collu-
sively acquired monopoly power; collusive acquisition of monopsony power is therefore gen-
erally equally illegal under the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms v. American
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948). Consumers had considerable input into the rental
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distorted or eliminated certain aspects of a competitive rental mar-
ket environment,"' it neither required, encouraged, or enforced
agreements by the producers or consumers in restraint of trade,
nor created a monopoly.231 Because it did not require or promote a
violation, it was not in true conflict with the Sherman Act. Federal
interest in prohibiting the regulation was lacking.
Employing a moderate and restrained view of both federal and
state policy, Rice v. Norman Williams Co. 23 2 can also be viewed as
posing a false conflict in favor of state law. In Rice, the enforce-
ment of a California statute that prohibited imports of liquor not
consigned to a licensed importer or authorized by the distiller was
challenged by state licensed but unauthorized liquor importers.
Because the statute enforced distillers' decisions to restrain compe-
tition for the importation of their brands into California, the
nonauthorized importers argued that the law gave "brand owners
the unfettered power to restrain competition, 2 3 3 a per se violation
of the Sherman Act,234 and that therefore the law should be
preempted.
rate process, Fisher, 475 U.S. at 269, but the ordinance did not enforce a set of rental prices
agreed upon by consumers who otherwise might compete with each other in a bidding war
for a particular rental unit. Similarly, the ordinance did not give monopsony power to any
renter or group of renters. To the extent that the law disallowed increases in rental rates, it
forced a short term distributional shift towards those actually able to rent. The decision
may reflect a conclusion that ultimate consumers or tenants cannot commit agreements in
restraint of trade, although the Court makes no pronouncement to this effect. See Wiley,
Berkeley, supra note 217, at 163-66 (arguing that Fisher could be interpreted as a populist-
based, nonefficiency, pro-consumer distribution promoting decision).
230. By taking away a certain range of price increases, the regulation denies landlords the
opportunity to compete by offering higher rents. The regulation may also have the effect of
fixing rates at the maximum level. Conceivably, rent control discourages new entry into the
market and hastens exit, thus giving remaining landlords a joint monopoly. Given the regu-
lation, however, no landlord or group is given an increase that can be exploited. The regula-
tion is designed to curb exploitation of the power they already have.
231. Fisher, 475 U.S. at 269-70.
232. 458 U.S. 654, 656-57 (1982). The law was designed to preserve the integrity of the
importing manufacturers distribution systems. The law prohibited California sellers of im-
ported liquor from obtaining supplies of various imported brands, not from the manufac-
turer's distribution system but from wholesalers in other states. Id. at 657.
233. Id. at 658 (quoting Norman Williams Co. v. Rice, 108 Cal. App. 3d 348, 356, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 563, 569 (1980), rev'd, 458 U.S. 654 (1982)).
234. Id. at 659.
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The California statute, however, did not require acts that inevi-
tably conflicted with Sherman Act policy.23 5 The regulation ena-
bled the owners to designate who could import, and thus who
could sell, their brands. Such authorizations by the owners did not
inevitably impose illegal restraints. The effect of the authorizations
would depend on whom the owners authorized and where author-
ized importers were located. In addition, vertical nonprice re-
straints are not per se antitrust offenses; even if the designations
resulted in exclusive importer territories, for example, such a prac-
tice might be reasonable and not illegal. 36 Accordingly, although
the regulation permitted distillers to distort the functioning of the
import market, the federal government did not have an interest in
prohibiting all activities enforced by the regulation.
Similarly, California's policy could be achieved without protec-
tion of activity by the brand owners that violated the Sherman
Act. The purpose of the regulation was to give distillers the oppor-
tunity to prevent California wholesalers from importing the distill-
ers' product by obtaining supplies from Oklahoma wholesalers.23
The regulation could serve that purpose without protecting those
distillers who used the authorization provisions to impose anticom-
petitive restrictions, such as territorial allocations, that would vio-
late the Sherman Act.2 38
As a result, there was no true conflict between state and federal
policy and preemption of the state law was unnecessary. The fed-
eral interest in preventing some activities that the owners might
undertake did not extend to a federal interest in prohibiting the
statute in its entirety, and California's interest in protecting its
regulation did not extend to protection of activities that would vio-
late the Sherman Act. State and federal policies could coexist; the
statute remained effective, but state policy would not rescue au-
235. Id. at 661-62.
236. Id. at 662. Vertical agreements other than resale price maintenance are subjected to
rule of reason analysis, and will be upheld as reasonable unless demonstrated to actually
cause anticompetitive effects. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S.
36 (1977).
237. Rice, 458 U.S. at 657.
238. Id at 662. The Supreme Court's conclusion in Rice is thus consistent with a re-
strained and moderate interpretation of the Sherman Act.
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thorization activities by distillers that violated Sherman Act
policy.
3. State regulations that provide protections against anticom-
petitive activity
A reassessment of prima facie or apparent conflicts may reveal
that a state regulates an anticompetitive activity in a way that pro-
vides antitrust protection sufficient to satisfy the federal interest.
When reconsideration discloses that state supervision of the activ-
ity effectively precludes possible antitrust harms, interfering with
the state regulatory system would not further Sherman Act poli-
cies. In such cases, a false conflict exists due to the lack of a federal
interest.
a. Adequate supervision
A state regulation such as the one in Parker v. Brown239 that
allows competitors to agree on prices and outputs creates an ap-
parent conflict with Sherman Act policy. If the state also regulates
the prices and output of these firms in a manner that eliminates
the welfare harms and pro-producer distributions that might result
from the agreements, however, Sherman Act policy is not facili-
tated by invalidating the agreements or the regulation. The Sher-
man Act prohibitions are based on the assumption that firms with
market power will harmfully exploit the power. If state regulation
removes all opportunities to exploit, compliance with the Sherman
Act creates a false conflict. The state supervision negates the fed-
eral interest in prohibiting the activity.
Accordingly, interest analysis accommodates state regulatory
needs, without implying federalism values, by allowing a state to
adopt a policy of shielding activities from the Sherman Act. A
state interested in doing so must satisfy federal concerns by enact-
ing a regulatory structure that ameliorates the antitrust harms
from the activity that ordinarily would be prevented by application
of the Sherman Act. A state that comprehensively regulates public
utilities, for example, does not do so in true conflict with the Sher-
man Act, as long as the state regulations prohibit a utility from
239. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
764 [Vol. 30:705
1989] INTEREST ANALYSIS APPLIED TO ANTITRUST CONFLICTS 765
reducing output and service quality and from extracting from con-
sumers more revenue than what would be sufficient to earn a com-
petitive rate of return.4 0 Although the regulation might raise an
apparent conflict, because entry protection and grants of monopoly
are not uncommon aspects of regulation of a natural monopoly
market,241 the conflict is in fact false.
The examination of whether the antitrust harms have been ame-
liorated by the full extent of the state's regulatory policy must fo-
cus on whether the regulatory system protects against the antitrust
harms from the activity that raises the apparent conflict. And the
examination should be strict. The quid pro quo of a restrained and
moderate interpretation of the Sherman Act is that the remaining
Sherman Act policies must not be nullified; thus the examination
should require that the state regulations protect the federal values
and render application of the Act superfluous. If state regulation
confers entry protection or monopoly power to a firm, or allows
competitors to make agreements concerning various aspects of
competition, and fails to protect consumers and society in general
from extraction of monopoly prices and imposition of welfare
losses by the beneficiaries of such regulations, the regulations con-
ferring the power are in true conflict and should be preempted.
Consequently, the federal interest is not satisfied simply by the
fact of oversight regulatory authority, by extensive regulation or by
a determination that the activity in question is in the public inter-
est.242 Oversight authority does not eliminate antitrust concerns;
extensive regulation may or may not provide protection, depending
on the regulatory structure adopted by the state. The public inter-
est standard may ignore or understate possible antitrust harms
from an activity;243 such a policy conflicts with the Sherman Act,
240. Several commentators have suggested that such regulations do not conflict with the
Sherman Act. See, e.g., Conant, supra note 6, at 265; Werden & Balmer, supra note 6, at 63.
Many academics believe, however, that comprehensive price and output regulation of natu-
ral monopolies is inadvisable. See, e.g., Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J. L. AND
ECON. 55 (1968); see also S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15-19, 156-83 (1982).
241. See S. BREYER, supra note 240, at 15.
242. Thus the assessment of the state regulation must be considerably different and more
strict than the current active supervision requirement for state action immunity. See infra
text accompanying notes 313-20.
243. See S. BREYER, supra note 240, at 71-95.
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which dictates that antitrust harms cannot be ignored or
discounted.
A showing simply that the conflicting activity is directed toward,
or takes place in, an industry characterized by market failure, or
that overall the regulation is efficient, similarly does not satisfy the
federal antitrust interest. Even in the presence of a natural monop-
oly or some other form of market failure, inefficient output effects
and extraction of wealth from consumers can result from allowing
firms to collude or conferring unsupervised market power. 44 De-
spite proof that a regulation is efficient, consumers may be worse
off if the activity that conflicts with the Sherman Act is permitted.
If so, the state's regulatory scheme does not adequately protect the
pro-consumer distribution value of the Sherman Act. 4
b. Spillover
A state's supervisory regulation of an industry may satisfy the
federal antitrust interest in restraining activity in that state, but
the federal interest in preventing the activity may persist if the
effects of the state-sanctioned and supervised activity spill over
into states that do not have regulations protecting against an-
ticompetitive abuses. 46 The federal antitrust interest in preventing
244. Nor is the federal interest satisfied by a showing that state or local level regulation is
the optimal level for regulation. See, e.g., Hovenkamp & Mackerron, supra note 64, at 765-
77. A decision by an optimal regulator to allow firms to agree on prices and output still
conflicts with Sherman Act policy unless the optimal regulator's program contains adequate
protections.
245. A regulation that enables firms to fix prices might be efficient; the reduction in the
resources firms had been using to compete on price might more than offset the welfare
losses from the lack of price competition. See, e.g., F. SCHERER, supra note 145, at 22. (I was
told in economics graduate school that this fact is true in part because "rectangles are usu-
ally bigger than triangles."). Consumers might face a higher price than they would if no
agreement existed, however. The resource savings is not necessarily passed on in better
quality or service, and even if it is, the regulation has removed the consumer's choice of
paying a lower price for inferior quality.
246. Many commentators have expressed a concern with the problem of state and local
regulations whose effect spills over into other jurisdictions. See Gifford, supra note 68, at
1296; Hovenkamp & Mackerron, supra note 64, at 768-71; Jorde, supra note 71, at 253;
Lopatka, supra note 5, at 945; Posner, supra note 64, at 718; see also Spitzer, supra note 65,
at 1320-21. Easterbrook, supra note 71, at 45-49, suggests that state regulation should be
preempted only if a monopoly overcharge spillover results; otherwise the regulation should
be allowed. The federal interest is not satisfied, however, simply by showing that the anti-
trust harms from an activity remain within state borders. Citizens of a state are entitled to
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the activity continues if the in-state supervision does not prevent
economically harmful out-of-state effects.24
c. Parker - the federal antitrust interest not satisfied
The California statute challenged in Parker v. Brown248 involved
regulatory supervision of the price and output agreements author-
ized by the regulation. The regulation instructed the Director of
Agriculture to supervise the program committee activities and the
programs established by the committee could not be implemented
without the approval of the state Agricultural Prorate Advisory
Commission. 249 The state also mandated that the instituted pro-
grams could not permit the producers to earn "unreasonable
profits. ' 25 0
Antitrust protection, however, was inadequate. The regulation
lacked a mechanism that would ensure that the producers, when
making agreements concerning prices and output, were not engag-
ing in welfare harmful output reduction. The absence of such a
protection is understandable, because the entire purpose of the De-
pression-era regulatory scheme was to get the industry to restrict
the protections of all federal policies, including those reflected in the Sherman Act and in
the supremacy clause of the Constitution. On the other hand, inefficient spillover does not
itself indicate a true conflict with the Sherman Act, because not all inefficiency-causing reg-
ulations conflict with Sherman Act policies. Some argue that the spillover might be an un-
constitutional interference with interstate commerce. See, e.g., Lopatka, supra note 5, at
1039.
247. A spillover test that would preempt all state regulations that resulted in inefficiency
spillovers (as distinct from overcharge spillovers), but would leave each state free to adopt
inefficient market-power-conferring regulation that did not impose the spillovers (thereby
promoting federalism values) is not workable. See Easterbrook, supra note 71, at 45-49;
Jorde, supra note 71, at 256; Spitzer, supra note 65, at 1321. The test probably would re-
quire preemption of all market power-conferring state regulation that is not efficient, be-
cause the misallocation of resources resulting from exercises of market power is "a general
equilibrium problem, involving the balance of all sectors in the economy." F. SCHERER,
supra note 145, at 18. The tracing of the ultimate welfare-loss effects of inefficient market-
power-conferring regulation would be difficult, but all effects are unlikely to remain within a
state. Even when the overcharge is not exported, the resource misallocation is likely to be.
248. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Pursuant to the regulation, program committees, consisting in
part of horizontal competitors, formulated the proration marketing programs that required
the producers to conform to quality classifications, prices, and output levels. Id.
.249. Id. at 346.
250. Id. Midcal suggests that if state supervision had not been present in Parker, the
California regulation might have been preempted. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 104 (1980). See also Lopatka, supra note 5, at 954.
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output in the hope that prices would rise and eliminate the De-
pression.15' But because output restriction agreements facilitate
output reduction-the exact activity thought to cause economic
harm-the state regulation requiring that activity undermined the
antitrust concern, despite the state's "unreasonable profits" ban.
In addition, the California raisins were sold to the world rather
than exclusively to California consumers.2 52 The California super-
vision could not ameliorate the harms from output reduction and
the distributional effects that occurred outside of the state. The
federal interest in prohibiting those antitrust harms was not satis-
fied by the California regulatory policy.
4. Modification of Sherman Act policy by other federal
regulation
A state regulation that apparently conflicts with Sherman Act
policy does not do so if the state policy is expressly or impliedly
approved by another federal regulation.2 53 Parker exemplifies such
a false conflict. At the time of the regulation in Parker, the De-
pression had resulted in a collapse of agricultural prices through-
out the Nation. Faith in the market was low. The Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, which authorized the Secretary
of Agriculture to issue orders limiting the quantity of specified ag-
ricultural products, including fruits, reflected a federal policy
251. During the Depression, it was thought that encouraging collusion among firms might
raise prices, and that the country might be able to cartelize itself out of the Depression. It is
now thought that such policies hurt rather than assist the efforts to escape the downward
cycle. See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 126-28 (2d ed. 1981).
252. Parker, 317 U.S. at 345. See also Jorde, supra note 71, at 253-54.
253. See Kennedy, supra note 72, at 41-43, 71 n.171; Gifford, supra note 68, at 1289.
Wiley, supra note 6, at 745-48, makes this point as part of his capture test. An evaluation of
whether the Sherman Act policy is modified by other federal regulatiorn does not involve
granting implied immunity for all private activity that is consistent with a federal regula-
tion. The question is whether a state policy that raises an apparent conflict with the Sher-
man Act but mirrors a federal policy is a true conflict, not whether a federal program enti-
tles private nonregulated parties to immunity. If a federal regulatory program includes
explicit or implied antitrust immunity for an activity, an identical state policy can protect
those activities from liability without conflicting with Sherman Act policy. The issue of
whether the federal regulatory program was designed to occupy the field and thus preempts
state regulation, however, may need to be resolved. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Grow-
ers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Werden & Balmer, supra note 6, at 35-40.
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designed to raise prices by reducing output. 54 Consequently, a
state-sanctioned output reduction program comported with federal
policy,255 and Parker did not pose a true conflict.256
D. True Conflicts
Many state action conflicts are true conflicts. In such cases, the
federal rule should prevail. If the state regulation is challenged di-
rectly, it should be preempted. If a private party claims the state
regulation as a defense, a court should deny the defense and apply
federal policy.
1. Midcal
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum25
involved a true conflict. The federal interest in not permitting pro-
ducers to dictate resale prices conflicted with a state policy requir-
ing such behavior,258 and the apparent conflict is not resolvable by
a restrained and modified reassessment. The state did not super-
vise the per se illegal vertical restraints or their effects in the in-
dustry; the state regulatory structure did not include, for example,
price regulation, review of the reasonableness of the restraints, or
other regulation of the terms of competition. The state left these
matters to the discretion of the industry. The state policy was in
true conflict with Sherman Act policy; the federal rule concerning
254. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 352-53.
255. See Kennedy, supra note 72, at 41-43; Wiley, supra note 6, at 745.
256. Output restraints are no longer an approved cure for depression. The Parker regula-
tions, unaccompanied by protection against harmful output reductions and monopoly prices,
now would conflict with federal antitrust policy and ought to be preempted.
257. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
258. In a sense, the regulations do not require agreements and thus arguably do not con-
flict with the Act. See, e.g., P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at 74. But the
regulations do require retailers adhere to manufacturer-dictated resale prices, an activity
that, according to various Supreme Court cases, is specifically forbidden by the Sherman
Act. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984); Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S.
145, 153 (1968); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911).
Thus, 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987), indicates that RPM (especially indus-
try wide RPM) rather than an RPM agreement is per se illegal. But see United States v.
Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (a manufacturer may announce resale prices and
refuse to deal with those not selling at that price).
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resale price maintenance requires preemption of a conflicting state
rule. 259
2. Southern Motor Carriers
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States'"
also involved a true conflict. The apparent conflict between Sher-
man Act policy that would prohibit collective ratemaking agree-
ments by truckers on various intrastate rates and a state policy of
allowing and encouraging the activity can not be resolved. The
Court, therefore, should have applied the Sherman Act policy of
preventing collective ratemaking among horizontal competitors.
The conflict is not avoided by the fairly extensive state regula-
tion of the trucking industry. Because each state had the theoreti-
cal power to disapprove any rates that might extract more than a
competitive rate from the consumer or inflict welfare losses on so-
ciety generally,261 the federal interest arguably was satisfied. This
"no true conflict" analysis of Southern Motor Carriers is superfi-
cial, however, because the state did not supervise the rate-bureau
activities or the deleterious effects of the agreements. Even though
the states supervised the carriers' rates and perhaps could keep the
rates below supernormal levels, the collective rate submissions may
have deprived consumers of the opportunity to choose from a vari-
ety of price and service combinations.262 State regulation did not
correct for this potential result of collective ratemaking.
In addition, despite extensive historical federal regulation of in-
terstate trucking and a prior federal policy of antitrust immunity
259. 324 Liquors, 479 U.S. 335 (1987), similarly is a true conflict requiring application of
federal law.
260. 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
261. Each state's Public Utility Commission maintained "ultimate authority and control"
over the rates. 471 U.S. at 51.
262. For example, if all carriers agreed to submit the same rates, price shopping would be
unavailable to consumers, yet the carriers would be in compliance unless the rate was unrea-
sonable. Id. at 79. In addition, most of the jointly filed rates could be approved routinely
without a hearing. See Jorde, supra note 71, at 245. The review did not adequately satisfy
the federal interest in protecting consumers and society from welfare losses and distribu-
tional shifts. Permitting truckers to set all intrastate rates collectively also could have a
significant spillover effect on interstate rates. The rates for movements between states that
allowed collectively set rates effectively were fixed; they were the sums of the intrastate
collectively set rates.
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for all interstate collective ratemaking, at the time of the case
there was no federal policy that could render the apparent conflict
false. After years of permitting collective ratemaking, the federal
government had largely deregulated the motor carrier industry and
significantly limited the antitrust immunity for collective ratemak-
ing of interstate rates."' This change of policy subjected interstate
trucking to price competition. The state policies no longer mir-
rored the federal policy.
3. Patrick
Patrick v. Burget, 26 4 too, presented a true conflict. At the time
the activities of the case took place, Congress had not expressed a
federal policy regarding medical peer review. The Oregon state pol-
icy, which may have included an interest in insulating all medical
peer review activity from antitrust liability, conflicted with the fed-
eral policy of preventing competitors from using peer review proce-
dures to hamper competition rather than to improve patient care.
The state policy, however, did not provide the level of antitrust
protection that would render the conflict false. The state did not
supervise the decisions of peer-review committees.26 5 The state did
oversee peer-review procedures, but the policy did not include a
structure that could monitor the decisions to ensure they were
avoiding antitrust harms.26 Nor does the current federal peer-re-
view policy resolve the conflict. Congress recently expressed a fed-
eral policy of immunizing peer-review action from antitrust dam-
age liability as long as the action is based on a "reasonable belief"
that it would further health care,267 but this expression came five
years after the acts in Patrick took place. Patrick thus presented a
true conflict, and necessitated application of the Sherman Act to
263. See 471 U.S. at 77 nn.19-20; 49 U.S.C. §§ 10706(b)(1)-(5) (1982). The Motor Carrier
Act of 1980 entirely removed immunity for collective ratemaking on single-line rates, and
subjected all permitted collective ratemaking activities to extensive procedural protections
built into federal law. In contrast, the state regulations permitted all collective ratemaking,
and the federal-style protections were not present in the state regulatory structures. 471
U.S. at 78.
264. 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988).
265. Id. at 1664.
266. Id. at 1664-65.
267. Id. at 1665 n.8, 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
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the defendants' activities. Preemption of anything other than a
state policy insulating peer-review activity from antitrust scrutiny
was unnecessary, however, and the same acts undertaken today
would be insulated from damages liability pursuant to federal
policy.268
4. Bates
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona29 raised a true conflict, not be-
cause the state adopted a policy of prohibiting advertising by law-
yers, but because the Arizona policy involved extensive anticompe-
titive agreements among lawyers. The rule against advertising,
which originated from an agreement by lawyers that advertising
was an unethical form of competition, was part of the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility. 7 0 The Arizona Supreme Court em-
powered to regulate lawyers in Arizona, required all lawyers in the
state to conform to the ABA code or be subject to discipline by the
Bar.27 1 The Arizona regulatory scheme thus allowed lawyers (i.e.,
competitors) to make agreements concerning the appropriate
methods of competition, to change the standard, to decide who had
violated the standard, and to institute disciplinary proceedings
against those who did not conform. Consequently, an apparent
conflict existed between the regulatory system and section 1 of the
Sherman Act.
The Arizona Supreme Court supervised the Bar activities. But
contrary to the United States Supreme Court's decision,273 the su-
pervision did not adequately ameliorate federal antitrust concerns.
Although the Arizona Supreme Court made the final decision con-
cerning all disciplinary matters, there was no supervision to ensure
268. The activities might still be enjoined, however, because the basis of the federal policy
is that exposure to damages chills the review. 42 U.S.C. § 11101.
269. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
270. Id. at 360.
271. Id.
272. In the absence of state involvement, such agreements among competitors would un-
questionably violate section 1 of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Den-
tists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679 (1978); Fashion Originator's Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
273. The Supreme Court indicated that the Arizona Supreme Court's "active" supervi-
sion of the bar played a significant role in the decision to give state action immunity to the
advertising ban. 433 U.S. at 362.
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that consumers denied the benefits of advertising would not suffer.
The Arizona Court apparently did not adequately recognize that
an agreement by lawyers to refrain from advertising would be
harmful to competition and the consuming public. 74
Within first amendment limits, a state can prescribe the kinds of
advertising lawyers may undertake without conflicting with the
Sherman Act.2175 Such regulation should not, however, leave the de-
cisions about the kinds and extent of permissible competition to
the industry. The Arizona system let the lawyers make agreements
concerning the levels of competition, and then enforced those
agreements. That system conflicted with the Sherman Act.
5. New Motor Vehicle Board of California
New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co. 276
also involved a true conflict, although the area of conflict, properly
assessed, is very narrow. The statute in question, the California
Automobile Franchise Act, required car manufacturers to obtain
approval from the New Motor Vehicle Board before granting a new
franchise if an existing franchisee located within ten miles of the
proposed new dealership protested.277 The Board had the power to
prohibit a proposed franchise permanently if the protestor demon-
strated sufficient good cause.2
The purpose of the regulation was to control manufacturer
abuses of franchisees, but the method chosen was to prohibit in-
creases in intrabrand competition if the new competition proved to
be injurious to both the existing franchisee and the public inter-
est.2179 The regulation therefore conferred entry protection and
could potentially allow the existing franchisee to maintain signifi-
cant market power, and thus appears to conflict with section 2 of
the Sherman Act.280
274. Id. at 356.
275. Id. at 359-63.
276. 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
277. Id. at 98-103.
278. Id. at 102-03.
279. Id. at 102.
280. The regulation did not require or allow territorial allocation agreements between
manufacturers and dealers, however, so it did not conflict with section 1, even if it facili-
tated de facto allocations.
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The California act contained several protections, however. The
ten-mile restriction itself was a protection; intrabrand competition
from outside of the area could significantly constrain the fran-
chisee. Interbrand competitors could not protest at all, so inter-
brand competition within (as well as outside) the ten-mile area
could not be eliminated. In addition, the state specified that a
finding that "the establishment of an additional franchise would
increase competition and therefore be in the public interest" 8' was
an appropriate criterion for refuting good cause. The criterion
helps to protect against prohibitions that would harm competition.
Consequently, actual conflict was minimal, and did not require
preemption of the statute. Nevertheless, if a prohibition by the
Board has the effect of maintaining market power for an existing
franchisee, that decision should be preempted, because the fran-
chisee is not supervised by the state in a way that would protect
consumers from exploitation of that power.2 82
IV. A CONTRAST BETWEEN INTEREST ANALYSIS AND CURRENT STATE
ACTION METHODOLOGY
In certain respects, the Supreme Court's current state action
methodology-involving both a threshold inquiry and California
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum's8 3 clear articu-
lation and active supervision requirements-implements an inter-
est analysis resolution of state action conflicts. The threshold test
is a preliminary inquiry as to whether there is an irreconcilable
281. 439 U.S. at 99-100 n.1.
282. In fact, the Motor Vehicle Board upheld only one of the first 117 protests. Although
the Court suggested that the California Act was consistent with federal policy, id. at 100-01,
the conflict is not avoided by a mirrored federal act. The federal policy only provided for
certain contract actions and did not provide franchisees with protection from abuse by any
system of entry protection. See Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act, 70 Stat. 1125 (1956)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1982)). The conflict is not avoided by a mirrored federal
act. See also Wiley, supra note 6, at 746-47 (assessing whether the California Act was suffi-
ciently analogous to a labor regulation to justify protecting the Act under the labor exemp-
tion to the antitrust laws). The Act also was challenged because the protest period poten-
tially gave the existing franchisee a few months of entry protection. As the Court pointed
out, however, dealers who pressed their protests for the sole purpose of delaying establish-
ment of a competitor might fall within the sham exception to Noerr contained in California
Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), and be vulnerable to anti-
trust suits. 439 U.S. at 110 & n.15.
283. See supra notes 257-59.
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conflict between the state regulation and the Sherman Act. Midcal,
far from solidifying Parker v. Brown's"4 state action immunity
into a rule that would insulate virtually any state policy from Sher-
man Act preemption, significantly limited Parker. Despite the Su-
preme Court's continuing affirmation of a state action immunity
based on federalism values,285 the Midcal requirements may have
been originally designed to limit Parker's state action immunity to
situations involving a false conflict due to a lack of a federal
interest.8 6
The threshold and Midcal requirements already implement at
least a partial interest analysis approach. A negative answer to the
threshold inquiry indicates a false conflict due to a lack of a fed-
eral interest, and enables the application of state policy. The ab-
sence of clear articulation indicates lack of a state interest, signal-
ling a false conflict in favor of federal policy and thus triggering
application of the Sherman Act. A failure to find active supervision
signals either a false conflict due to no state interest or a true con-
flict, both of which are resolved by choosing federal policy. When
the state has an interest in protecting an activity, as evidenced by
a clearly articulated policy of replacing competition with the regu-
lated activity, and the federal government does not have a corre-
sponding interest in preventing that activity, evidenced by state
supervision that satisfies federal antitrust concerns, a false conflict
in favor of state policy allows that policy to persevere.
Parker and its progeny are not wholly inconsistent with interest
analysis. Despite its federalism bent, the Court in Parker did not
assert that all state policies were protected from the Sherman Act
solely by virtue of being sovereign enactments.8 7 Although the
284. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
285. See Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1662-63 (1988); Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475
U.S. 260, 265-67 (1986); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 471
U.S. 48, 56 (1985); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97,
103-05 (1980). See also Jorde, supra note 71, at 240-47.
286. See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105. The Midcal tests apparently were drawn from Bates v.
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Bates had noted that Sherman Act values and fed-
eral supremacy values are impaired by allowing a state to adopt a contrary scheme, but
concluded that when the state "clearly and affirmatively" expresses its policy and when "the
State's supervision is so active," the concern that federal policy is being unnecessarily and
inappropriately subordinated to state policy is reduced. Id. at 362.
287. 317 U.S. at 351.
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Court did not specifically employ an interest analysis methodology,
the results of many United States Supreme Court state action
cases-including Parker v. Brown,"ss California Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum," 9 Cantor v. Detroit Edison
Co., 290 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,291 Rice v. Norman Williams
Co., 292 Fisher v. City of Berkeley,2 9 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 294
and Patrick v. Burget295-are consistent with an interest analysis.
On the other hand, the threshold inquiry and the Midcal test's
methodology depart from an interest analysis in some significant
ways. The current process identifies some false conflicts and selects
the law of the only interested jurisdiction in those cases. Especially
in light of recent pronouncements concerning the active supervi-
sion requirement, however, the process does not implement an in-
terest analysis that selects state law only in the event of a false
conflict resulting from the lack of a true federal interest in
preventing an activity.
A. The Threshold Requirement
The Supreme Court has indicated that "the threshold question"
in state action cases is whether the challenged restraint is "incon-
sistent, 296 or "irreconcilably conflicts" with the Sherman Act.
297 If
the answer is no, the Court goes no further, finding no federal in-
288. 317 U.S. 341.
289. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
290. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
291. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
292. 458 U.S. 654 (1982).
293. 475 U.S. 260 (1986).
294. 479 U.S. 335 (1987).
295. 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988).
296. 324 Liquor Corp., 479 U.S. at 341 (citing Midcal, 445 U.S. at 102). See also P.
AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at 84 (the initial question is whether the activity
involved "restrain[s] competition so much as to be inconsistent on its face with the Sherman
Act").
297. Rice, 458 U.S. at 659 (1982). In 324 Liquor, the initial inquiry was whether the state
regulation imposing "a regime of resale price maintenance on all New York liquor retailers,"
479 U.S. at 341, was inconsistent with section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court found the
regulation inconsistent, and moved on to determine if, despite the inconsistency, the regula-
tion was nonetheless eligible for state action protection. Id. at 343. In Rice, the initial in-
quiry addressed a California regulation prohibiting all licensed liquor importers from
purchasing or accepting "delivery of any brand of distilled spirits unless he is designated as
an authorized importer of such brand by the brand owner.... ." 458 U.S. at 656-57. The Rice
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terest, and, consequently, a false conflict. If the answer is yes, the
state policy will be preempted unless it is eligible for state action
immunity. 98
Accordingly, the threshold inquiry facilitates identification of a
federal interest. Like Currie's approach, the inquiry seems to con-
template a moderate and restrained reassessment of Sherman Act
policy. Regulation does not automatically conflict with the Sher-
man Act even though it may distort a competitive market environ-
ment. In Rice and Fisher, for example, the Court used the thresh-
old inquiry to conclude that there was no "irreconcilable conflict"
between the Sherman Act and the regulations in question.29 9 In
each case, the regulation tampered significantly with the market
but did not require or allow firm behavior proscribed by the Sher-
man Act. The Court upheld each regulation without an assessment
of state action immunity. The cases were thus handled as false
conflicts due to no federal interest.300
The threshold inquiry suggests a concern with true and false
conflicts. Rather than using the test to extensively assess federal
and state policies and interests, however, the Court seems instead
to be using it as a preliminary and somewhat superficial review of
whether the regulated activity falls within Sherman Act prohibi-
tions. Fisher, for example, focused exclusively on agreements and
did not fully assess federal interests.30 1 In addition, the inquiry
does not assess the extent of the state's interest and thus does not
identify false conflicts resulting from no true state interest.302 As a
result, although the threshold inquiry will identify some false con-
regulation was not inconsistent, removing the need for further inquiry into state and federal
interests.
298. See, e.g., Rice, 458 U.S. at 662. This conclusion may have different effects, depending
on how the state action issue arises. A state law not inconsistent with the Sherman Act will
not be preempted. The finding that the state law does not conflict with the Sherman Act
may be due to the fact that the state policy does not include the activity that a defendant
claims should receive immunity. Consequently, in a private suit, a private defendant may
not be able to use the law as protection from the Sherman Act.
299. See supra notes 226-38 and accompanying text.
300. See also Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (finding that a state
law prohibiting vertical integration by oil companies into retail distribution might have an
anticompetitive effect, but nevertheless did not conflict with the Sherman Act).
301. See Fisher, 475 U.S. at 269-70.
302. It could also result in ignoring an apparent conflict. Rice, for example, did not exten-
sively assess California's interest in protecting the activities authorized in its regulation
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flicts and leave the state law intact, and will also identify an appar-
ent federal interest when the activity appears to fall within a Sher-
man Act proscription, the threshold analysis alone does not
currently involve a comprehensive interest analysis.
B. The Midcal Requirements
If the threshold inquiry indicates that the federal government
has an interest in prohibiting a state-regulated activity, state pol-
icy is more fully evaluated using the clear articulation and active
supervision requirements from Midcal. If the requirements are not
met, the state regulation is not applied to protect the activity, ap-
parently because the implied Sherman Act federalism values re-
main unimpaired. In addition, however, the absence of such articu-
lation and supervision may indicate the lack of a state interest in
protecting the activity from the Sherman Act requirements,
thereby creating a false conflict. Conversely, the presence of both
articulation and supervision may suggest that the state has an in-
terest in protecting an activity but the federal government may
lack an interest in prohibiting it. The Midcal requirements thus
complement the interest analysis implications of the threshold
inquiry.
1. The clear articulation requirement
The clear articulation requirement implements a basic interest
analysis prerequisite by facilitating identification of the state pol-
icy. The absence of a clearly articulated, affirmatively expressed
state policy favoring a particular activity may suggest a policy of
neutrality concerning the activity,"' a policy that will not be im-
paired by application of federal law. In the event of such an ab-
sence, both the federal antitrust policy and the state policy can be
applied without conflict. Cantor and Goldfarb, presaging Midcal's
adoption of the clear articulation requirement, suggest strongly
that the requirement is a tool for determining when conflicts are
rendered false by the lack of a state interest.
from Sherman Act liability, the extent of the California's regulatory scheme, and the pres-
ence of other federal policies that might affect the federal interest.
303. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 59
(1985).
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The requirement was applied in Southern Motor Carriers Rate
Conference v. United States in a manner suggesting that if a state
has an interest in protecting its policy from Sherman Act liability,
the requirement is satisfied.0 4 Brushing aside the argument that
the states failed to satisfy the clear articulation requirement be-
cause the states did not compel collective ratemaking, the Court
indicated that a clearly articulated intent to adopt a permissive
policy satisfies the requirement.30 5
As it now stands, however, the clear articulation requirement
does not fully coincide with interest analysis. The answer to the
question of whether the state has clearly articulated its intention
to displace competition may not correlate closely enough with the
answer to the question of whether the state has an interest in pro-
tecting the activity in question from the Sherman Act. The clear
articulation test runs a dual danger: too much flexibility could re-
sult in finding a clearly articulated state policy when a state inter-
est in protecting an activity is lacking, while an overly insistent
clear articulation requirement could result in ignoring and thus
perhaps needlessly nullifying an actual state interest.
One commentator has argued that the requirement has become
very lenient and will be satisfied if the anticompetitive conduct is a
"'foreseeable' or 'logical' result" of a state regulation.30 6 This view
of the requirement would provide immunity for private actions if
the state "delegates regulatory authority for a particular type of
activity or area of the economy. '307 Foreseeable or logical conduct,
however, may not be conduct the state has an actual interest in
protecting. Under such a standard, the false conflict result in Can-
tor might be reversed; a court might well have found that Michi-
gan clearly articulated a policy of replacing competition with regu-
lation, because it regulated in the area, and the tied-sale conduct
of the utility was not only foreseeable, it was approved.
Conversely, under a more stringent requirement, a state may
have an interest in protecting an activity but fail to articulate its
policy clearly. The focus in Southern Motor Carriers was on the
304. Id. at 60.
305. Id.
306. Jorde, supra note 71, at 242 (citing Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34,
42 (1985)). See also Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568-69 (1984).
307. Jorde, supra note 71, at 247.
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clearly articulated intent of the state to displace competition.30 8 In-
terest analysis, however, requires assessment of the underlying pol-
icies rather than the legislative intent,309 and lack of clarity is not
synonymous with lack of interest. If the legislators did not con-
ceive of the need for protection and thus did not express their "in-
tent," but protection nevertheless is a necessary ingredient of the
policy, the interest may be ignored under the clear articulation re-
quirement. In such a case, the federal policy would be applied,
without considering whether the state actually has an interest and
whether the policies actually conflict.31 0
The Court also has shown an inclination toward providing ipso
facto immunity for state activity without assessing the extent to
which state policy involves agreements or entry protection policies
that conflict with the Sherman Act. In Hoover v. Ronwin, for ex-
ample, the Court found state supreme court involvement with the
Bar committee activity, granted immunity, and ended the inquiry,
refusing to consider whether the state had clearly articulated a pol-
icy that conflicted with the Sherman Act.31' The basis for the im-
munity was "that the State itself has chosen to act." '12 This ap-
proach ignores identification of the state policy and interest.
The clear articulation requirement probably was designed to re-
strict state action immunity to those cases in which the state has a
policy that would be furthered by protecting an activity that actu-
ally conflicts with Sherman Act policy.3 13 The requirement does
308. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 64.
309. See Ratner, supra note 116, at 819; Sedler, supra note 116, at 610.
310. Using Patrick as an example, a stringent requirement might ignore Oregon's possible
interest in insulating all peer review activities, including anticompetitive ones, from the
Sherman Act. Because Oregon did not clearly articulate and adequately express the need to
insulate all peer review from the Sherman Act (to preserve the beneficial aspects of the peer
review and to avoid wholesale refusals by the peers to undertake the reviews), state action
immunity probably was not available. But if no peer-review program will be effective if the
reviewers are subjected to Sherman Act scrutiny, Oregon would in fact have an interest in
protecting the activity. If, unlike Oregon's actual policy, the state policy included an inde-
pendent state review to ensure that peer review decisions were health-based rather than
competitively based, that policy could satisfy the federal interest and avoid a conflict. Nev-
ertheless, under a state action analysis, the failure to meet the first prong of the Midcal test
might nullify the state policy.
311. 466 U.S. 558 (1984).
312. Id. at 574.
313. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 362 (1977) (clear articulation reduces
the "concern that federal policy is being unnecessarily and inappropriately subordinated to
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implement the false conflict result of applying federal policy if the
state has not articulated its policy of displacing competition
clearly. A far more effective method, however, would be to simply
ask: does the state have an interest in protecting the activity from
Sherman Act policy? The articulated policies of the state will, of
course, be of substantial use in answering that question.
2. The active supervision requirement
When the threshold and clear articulation analyses suggest that
the federal government has a policy of restraining an activity and
the state has a policy of protecting it, the second prong of the Mid-
cal test-a requirement that the challenged restraint be "'actively
supervised' by the State itself"314 -is applied. Although not clearly
specified to achieve such a goal, the requirement could be a deter-
minant of whether the apparent conflict between the state regula-
tory policy and Sherman Act policy is in fact a true conflict. Under
an interest analysis, supervision that satisfies federal antitrust con-
cerns signals a false conflict due to the lack of a true federal inter-
est, and the state policy survives. A state policy of providing firms
with an unsupervised opportunity to extract wealth in a manner
harmful to efficiency or consumer-biased distribution signals a true
conflict between the state and federal policy requiring application
of federal law.
Perhaps the interest analysis implication originally was implic-
itly recognized in the active supervision requirement. Some Su-
preme Court language implies that the requirement was meant to
determine if the supervision vitiated antitrust harms from the ac-
tivity. 15 The Court, however, has not identified the active supervi-
state policy."). Before Midcal adopted the requirement, Areeda and Turner described the
test as a method for ensuring that a state rather than a private policy existed and that the
state policy is actually inconsistent with federal antitrust policy. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 157, 215b, at 80-92. But see Page, supra note 5, at 628-29
(describing the requirement as requiring "[a]n explicit legislative choice in conflict with the
antitrust laws," because explicit legislative choices are entitled to greater deference than
policies adopted by executive or independent agencies).
314. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980)
(quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)).
315. See, e.g., Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 79
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Active supervision of the rate bureau process-like that
provided in the Motor Carrier Act of 1980-might minimize the anticompetitive effects of
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sion requirement as a tool for ensuring that a state policy that ap-
parently conflicts with the Sherman Act can avoid preemption only
if the state supervises private activity sufficiently to eliminate the
antitrust harms created by the policy. Instead, apparently in an
effort to accommodate federalism values, the requirement has be-
come a gauge of state involvement with the activity. The Court
recently described the requirement as "designed to ensure that the
state action doctrine will shelter only the particular anticompeti-
tive acts of private parties that, in the judgment of the State, actu-
ally further state regulatory policies." 1 ' The requirement provides
"realistic assurance that a private party's anticompetitive conduct
promotes state policy '"3  and thus serves "essentially an eviden-
tiary function: it is one way of ensuring that the actor is engaging
in the challenged conduct pursuant to state policy. '318
These descriptions simply recapitulate the clear articulation re-
quirement, used to ascertain whether the state has clearly ex-
collective ratemaking.... Unless the Commissions 'actively supervise' the price-fixing pro-
cess itself, they cannot eliminate the upward pressure on rates caused by collusive ratemak-
ing." Id. at 79.); see also Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1663 (1988) ("the mere presence
of some state involvement or monitoring does not suffice").
316. Patrick, 108 S. Ct. at 1663.
317. Id. The active supervision requirement probably has its basis in the Parker language
that "a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing
them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful," Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341,
351 (1943) (cited in Midcal, 445 U.S. at 104, 106), and in the fact that Parker pointed to
California supervision as a reason why the activity in question was "state" policy. Midcal,
445 U.S. at 104.
318. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46 (1985). The requirement proba-
bly was not intended as a method of determining whether an activity is part of a state policy
and thus deserves protection. In Midcal, the Court found a lack of state supervision over the
state-mandated resale price maintenance scheme, because the state did not establish prices,
review reasonableness, or otherwise regulate the terms, leaving those matters to the indus-
try. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105-06. Consequently, state action immunity was unavailable, and
the Sherman Act preempted the law. The preemption, however, can scarcely be justified on
the ground that because the state did not supervise the activities, the required activities
were not really promoting state policy. The state explicitly enforced the privately estab-
lished resale prices and was interested in protecting its policy. The law was properly pre-
empted not because the acts were not part of state policy, but because the state policy of
protecting those acts conflicted with federal antitrust policy. Without state supervision that
ameliorates the potential antitrust harms from the activity, federal law should prevail. Con-
sequently, Midcal did not use the active supervision requirement to conclude that applica-
tion of federal law would not be intrusive because the sovereign state had no policy. The
requirement was used to protect supremacy clause and Sherman Act values in a true conflict
between state and federal policy.
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pressed a policy designed to depart from the federal laws.3 19 They
do not call for assessment of whether the supervision ameliorates
the antitrust harm. Without such an assessment, however, immu-
nity can be granted, and the state policy applied, in a true conflict.
As Bates v. State Bar of Arizona 20 demonstrates, state supervi-
sion of an activity to ensure that the activity departs from the fed-
eral policy would satisfy this version of the active supervision re-
quirement. Such a regulatory system, however, obviously would
not negate Sherman Act concerns. If state supervision does not
ameliorate those concerns, the supervision may only more clearly
demonstrate that a true conflict exists and that state policy should
be preempted.
Consequently, the current state action methodology only goes
part of the way with interest analysis and contains a fatal flaw.
The state action rule appears to be: in case of a true conflict, if
supervision indicates the activity is part of state policy, choose
state law. The result can unacceptably nullify what should be an
overriding federal interest.
C. Municipal Regulations
The current approach for handling possible municipal conflicts
with the Sherman Act is characterized by a distinct lack of clarity.
Use of interest analysis to resolve possible federal-municipal con-
flicts would avoid the needless state action inquiry into whether
municipal compulsion or authorization of an activity furthers a
policy expressly articulated by the state.321 The possible federal
preemption issue raised by municipal action is essentially the same
as the state action question: whose law should apply if federal law
appears to conflict with a municipal regulation? Municipalities are
recognized as political subdivisions of the state, and neither the
319. See Jorde, supra note 71, at 244-50 (arguing that the requirement currently does not
require intense supervision and promotes the federalism value of ensuring citizen participa-
tion); Wiley, supra note 6, at 721, 733-36; Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory
Process, supra note 68, at 1128-30.
320. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
321. Under the current tests, the municipal activity is protected only if protecting the
municipality, or the activity with which the municipality is involved, furthers a clearly ar-
ticulated, affirmatively expressed state policy. See supra text accompanying notes 50-63.
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Constitution nor federalism requires that they receive different
treatment. 22
The resolution of a potential municipal-federal conflict should
not hinge on whether the state clearly articulates its authorization
for a municipality to undertake an activity. If the state does not
forbid the municipality from enacting such an ordinance, the mu-
nicipal action does not conflict with state law. The real issue, how-
ever, is whether the ordinance conflicts with federal law.
As with possible federal-state conflicts, the underlying purposes
and interests of the federal and municipal policies should be iden-
tified. If they reveal a false conflict, the law that implements an
interest should be applied. 23 If either state or municipal supervi-
sion negates antitrust harms by an apparently conflicting munici-
pal policy, the municipal policy may not be in true conflict with
federal law. If an apparent conflict is not eliminated by a more
moderate and restrained interpretation, the municipal regulation
should be preempted by federal law.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has resolved cases involving conflict be-
tween the federal antitrust policy of the Sherman Act and state or
municipal regulation by reading into the Act vague federalism
principles that give immunity to clearly articulated and actively
supervised "state action." This constrained interpretation of the
Sherman Act enables a state to circumvent federal policy and the
supremacy clause preemption mandate by firmly identifying and
implementing a contrary state policy.
The tension raised by conflicts between state and local regula-
tions and the Sherman Act can be more effectively resolved by ap-
plication of the interest analysis proposed by Brainerd Currie for
322. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 69 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court's justification for the distinction is that mu-
nicipalities are not "sovereign" but states are. See Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 38 (citing
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412 (1978)). This rationale
apparently stems from the notion that the Sherman Act contains a set of federalism values
pertaining only to states.
323. The threshold inquiry currently implements this approach to some extent, by identi-
fying some false conflicts due to a lack of federal interest. See, e.g. Fisher v. City of Berke-
ley, 475 U.S. 260 (1986).
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resolution of multistate conflicts. Interest analysis calls for the
identification of the policies underlying each apparently competing
regulation. The goal is to determine whether either or both of the
policies will be furthered, and a corresponding federal or state in-
terest manifested, by application of the policy to the activity in
question.
Interest analysis accommodates federalism values without im-
puting them into the Sherman Act. The absence of either a state
or a federal interest creates a false conflict, thereby accommodat-
ing federalism concerns, because in such a case, the policy of the
only interested jurisdiction is applied, and intrusion is avoided. In
addition, before final resolution of an apparent conflict between
federal and state interests, the policies and interests should be re-
considered and if possible given more moderate and restrained
interpretations.
The reconsideration should recognize (1) that the Sherman Act
is not so broad in scope as to proscribe all anticompetitive or all
inefficient activity, including state and local regulations; (2) that
other federal regulations may indicate limitations on Sherman Act
policy; and (3) that state or municipal regulatory policies may in-
clude regulation that in fact protects Sherman Act policy. The re-
consideration will therefore identify as false many of the apparent
conflicts between state and municipal regulations and the Sherman
Act, and state and local regulatory authority will not be under-
mined on a wholesale basis. Conflict is avoided if the regulation
does not compel or condone agreements in restraint of trade and
does not confer unconstrained market power to a firm or group of
firms. Regulations that do so, however, will be preempted unless
the state regulation fully ameliorates the antitrust harms from
those conflicting activities, or the regulation mirrors another fed-
eral policy.
If a true conflict remains, state regulation will be preempted by
federal antitrust policy, pursuant to the supremacy clause. The
clause, which provides for a uniform result in cases of true conflict,
accommodates federal policy.
Current Supreme Court doctrine, including threshold inquiry
and Midcal's clear articulation and active supervision require-
ments, may reflect an interest analysis to some extent. The doc-
trine, however, is largely wedded to unspecified notions of federal-
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ism, and ends up sacrificing federal policy and supremacy clause
values in favor of state autonomy. A more direct, explicit interest
analysis would handle state action conflicts in a manner more con-
sistent with federal policies, state policies and the constitutional
mandate of the supremacy clause. Interest analysis focuses on the
real problem of possibly conflicting policies and supremacy clause
preemption, rather than on whether state action "rules" have been
satisfied. The analysis would not assume away the federal interest
in applying its Sherman Act policy to state-regulated activity, be-
cause states would not be allowed to depart from Sherman Act
proscriptions simply by a clear assertion and supervision of con-
trary policy. Nevertheless, state economic regulation would not be
extensively undermined. Interest analysis could eliminate the curi-
ous current disparate treatment of municipal regulation. And per-
haps most significant, it would stimulate a clearer delineation of
what the Sherman Act proscribes, and why.
